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Case Comments
Commercial Law: Disclaimer and Limitation of
Liability Clause Denied Effect in Tort Action
for Nonintentional Misrepresentation
In purchasing data processing services from defendant,
plaintiff relied on defendant's nonintentional misrepresentation
that an automated accounting system was the only way to obtain
a desired inventory control system. The contract, which pro-
vided only that defendant would furnish plaintiff with an auto-
mated accounting system, disclaimed any express or implied war-
ranties not included in the written contract, and limited defend-
ant's liability to the contract price of approximately $200,000.
In more than three years of use, the system failed to provide
satisfactory inventory control, although it did perform its ac-
counting function with a reasonable degree of success. The
plaintiff sought recovery on the contract for breach of warranty
and alternatively in tort for misrepresentation. In awarding
damages of $481,000, an amount more than double the contract
price, the court heZd that although the disclaimer and the clause
limiting liability were effective to deny plaintiff any recovery in
an action on the contract, they were ineffective in a tort action
for misrepresentation. Clements Auto Company v. Service Bu-
reau Corporation, 298 F. Supp. 115 (D. Minn. 1969).
A small majority of courts,1 following the leading English
case of Derry v. Peek,2 hold that scienter is an essential element
of misrepresentation. Those courts that do not require scienter
have reached that result by gradually overstepping the bound-
aries of several theories. Historically, scienter has not been an
essential element for rescission of a contract,3 breach of war-
ranty, misrepresentation resulting in physical (as contrasted to
economic) harm or ordinary negligence.4
Many courts, proceeding on a negligence theory, came to
regard the defendant's knowledge that he did not have a suffi-
cient basis of information to make the representation as equiva-
1. W. PROSSER, THE LAw or TORTS § 102, at 726 (3rd ed. 1964)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
2. 14 App. Cas. 337 (1889). The court held that an action in deceit
does not lie for any misrepresentation that is innocent or merely negli-
gent.
3. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 724.
4. C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS,
1136-37 (1959).
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lent to scienter.5 It was but a small step then to impose liability
where defendant had a belief that the representation was true.6
This final step, which imposes a type of strict liability for
misrepresentation, has been recognized and approved since near
the turn of the century.7 Minnesota is one of a sizable minority
of jurisdictions which do not regard scienter as an essential
element of misrepresentation. 9 The Minnesota rule was stated
in Schlechter v. Felton:10
[W]here defendant has made a false representation of a ma-
terial fact, susceptible of knowledge and relating to a matter
in which he has an interest, and as to which he may be
expected to have knowledge, and makes such statement un-
qualifiedly and as of his own knowledge, and with intent to in-
duce action, he cannot be heard to say, after the statement has
been acted upon by the plaintiff to his damage, that he hon-
estly believed that the statement he made was true."
Thus, imposition of liability for nonintentional misrepresenta-
tion is firmly entrenched in Minnesota law and is gaining ac-
ceptance in other jurisdictions. Minnesota makes no distinction
between innocent, negligent and intentional misrepresentation. 12
5. PRossER, supra note 1, at 700.
6. "If, when a man thinks it highly probable that a thing exists,
he chooses to say he knows the thing exists, that is really asserting what
is false-it is positive fraud." Brownlie v. Campbell, 5 App. Cas. 925,
953 (1880), cited in Schlechter v. Felton, 134 Minn. 143, 144, 158 N.W.
813, 814 (1916).
7. E.g., Williston, Liability for Innocent Misrepresentation, 24
HAnv. L. REv. 415, 437 (1911).
8. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 726.
9. Hanson v. Ford Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1960); Davis
v. Re-Trac MVIfg. Corp., 276 Minn. 116, 149 N.W.2d 37 (1967).
10. 134 Minn. 143, 158 N.W. 813 (1916). See also Hanson v. Ford
Motor Co., 278 F.2d 586 (8th Cir. 1960).
11. 134 Minn. at 147, 158 N.W. at 815.
12. E.g., Dorsey Products Corp. v. United States Rubber Co., 21
App. Div. 2d 866, 251 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1964), aff'd 16 N.Y.2d 925, 264
N.Y.S.2d 917, 212 N.E.2d 435 (1965). The denomination of misrepre-
sentation seems to be somewhat unclear. Fraudulent misrepresentation
exists where there is "scienter" or intent to deceive. "There is ... no
difficulty in finding the required intent to mislead where it appears
that the speaker believes his statement to be false." PROSSER, supra
note 1, at 715. The difficulty arises in the denomination of those mis-
representations where an intent to deceive does not exist. B cx's
LAw DicTlNRMY 752 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) defines negligent misrepresen-
tation as "a false representation made by a person who has no reason-
able grounds for believing it to be true, though he does not know that
it is untrue, or even believes it to be true," and innocent misrepresenta-
tion as "where the person making the representation had reasonable
grounds for believing it to be true." That this difference is difficult to
distinguish is further demonstrated by Dean Prosser's statement that
"A representation made with an honest belief in its truth may still be
1970]
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The court considered five representations in Clements, pri-
marily defendant's statement that the only way plaintiff would
ever get an inventory control system was by automating its ac-
counting.'3 The court recognized that there was no proof that
the defendant knew the statement was false "when it was ut-
tered,"114 but found this fact immaterial because scienter is not
required.' 5 The other four representations were subsidiary to
the promise of inventory control and dealt with various aspects
of implementing the system. Of all five representations, the
court found that the defendant either knew them to be false or,
"which is more likely, asserted [thera] as of its own knowledge
without knowing whether they were true or false."' 6  On the
basis of the court's finding of facts there seems to be little doubt
that the Minnesota requirements for misrepresentation were sat-
isfied.'7
Having found liability for misrepresentation, the court con-
sidered the effect of the warranties. Although the Uniform
Commercial Code, which was adopted in Minnesota after the
negligent, because of lack of reasonable care in ascertaining the facts,
or in the manner of expression, or absence of the skill and competence
required by a particular business or profession." PRossEs, supra note
1, at 719.
13. 298 F. Supp. at 125.
14. Id. at 126.
15. Id., citing the following cases: Lack Indus., Inc. v. Ralston
Purina Co., 327 F.2d 266, 277 (8th Cir. 1964); Hollerman v. F. H. Peavey
& Co., 269 Minn. 221, 228, 130 N.W.2d 534, 539 (1964); Swanson v.
Domning, 251 Minn. 110, 114, 86 N.W.2d 716, 720 (1957); Spiess v.
Brandt, 230 Minn. 246, 252, 41 N.W.2d 561, 566 (1950).
16. 298 F. Supp. at 131.
17. The court summarized the requirements for misrepresentation
as follows:
1. There must be a representation;
2. That representation must be false;
3. It must have to do with a past or present fact;
4. That fact must be material;
5. It must be susceptible of knowledge;
6. The representer must know it to be false, or in the alter-
native, must assert it as of his own knowledge without knowing
whether it is true or false;
7. The representer must intend to have the other person
induced to act, or justified in acting upon it;
8. That person must be so induced to act or so justified in
acting;
9. That person's action must be in reliance upon the repre-
sentation;
10. That person must suffer damage;
11. That damage must be attributable to the misrepresenta-
ton, that is, the statement must be the proximate cause of
the injury.
Id. at 125.
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contract in the present case had been made but before the litiga-
tion arose, does not specifically apply to contracts involving serv-
ices, it should be considered an indication of modern policy in
commercial law.
Express warranties may not be disclaimed under section
2-316 but may be excluded by the parol evidence rule in section
2-202. Section 2-202 provides that a writing intended by the
parties as the final expression of their agreement cannot be con-
tradicted by parol evidence but may be explained by evidence
of consistent terms unless the court finds that the writing was
to be an exclusive statement of the agreement. Most disclaim-
ers, including the one in the present case, seek to present the
contract as an integration and thus could be construed as exclu-
sive agreements under section 2-202.18 This section is intended
to allow sellers to prevent buyers from making false claims of
oral warranties.0
In addition, sections 2-718 and 2-719 of the Code expressly
allow contracting parties to limit liability arising under Article
2 of the Code, as long as the stipulated amount is reasonable in
light of the possible damages. Such a result gives force to the
public policy sustaining the right of contract unless the contract
violates a principle of greater importance.20
Thus, in holding that the disclaimer sufficed to deny the
plaintiff recovery on breach of express warranty2 and that the
clause limiting liability was valid with respect to any contract
claim,22 the court's decision was consistent with the provisions
of the Code. However, the court reached a different result by
applying the Minnesota law of misrepresentation. Unfortunately
the court did not clearly present the rationale or authority for
denying effect under the misrepresentation claim to both the
disclaimer and the provision limiting liability, but merely stated
that clauses limiting liability "do not limit the recovery for fraud
or misrepresentation."23 The two cases on which the court relied
to support this proposition hold that misrepresentation vitiates
the contractual relationship of the parties, but in both cases the
18. Note, Warranties, Disclaimers and the Parol Evidence Rule, 53
COLUm. L. REv. 858, 870 (1953).
19. Id. at 859.
20. See, e.g., Michigan Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Canadian N.
Ry. Co., 152 F.2d 292, 295 (8th Cir. 1945).
21. 298 F. Supp. at 139.
22. Id. at 140.
23. Id.
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misrepresentation, unlike that of the present case, was inten-
tional.24
The decision may, however, be partially reconciled with both
the Code and Minnesota case law. While the Code is an attempt
to codify the law applicable to most commercial transactions, the
draftsmen realized that it could not possibly anticipate all situa-
tions. Thus, section 1-103 allows the principles of law and equity
relative to fraud and misrepresentation to supplement the provi-
sions of the Code unless specifically displaced by particular pro-
visions thereof. This section is consistent with the Minne-
sota rule of statutory interpretation that a statute will not be
construed as abrogating a well established principle of law unless
such intention is clearly expressed in the statute.25
The Minnesota rule regarding the treatment of disclaimers
where there has been misrepresentation is best explained in
National Equipment Corporation v. Volden26 where a buyer
claimed that purchased equipment conformed to neither the sell-
er's oral nor written representations. Although the contract con-
tained both a disclaimer and an integration clause, the court held
that parol evidence was admissible to show that the contract was
procured through misrepresentation, -whether intentional, negli-
gent or innocent.27
If the rule denying validity to d-sclaimers in cases of non-
intentional misrepresentation seems to undercut the policy set
out in section 2-202 of the Code, it must be remembered that lia-
bility may be escaped entirely if the seller qualifies his repre-
sentation by stating that it is only an opinion or by indicating
the source of the information on which the statement was
based.28 The actual utility of this tool, however, is somewhat
24. Channel Master Corp. v. Aluminum Ltd. Sales, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d
403, 176 N.Y.S.2d 259, 151 N.E.2d 833 (1958); Lyman v. Romboli, 293
Mass. 373, 199 N.E. 916 (1936).
25. See Thornton Bros. Co. v. Reese, 188 Minn. 5, 246 N.W. 527
(1933).
26. 190 Minn. 596, 252 N.W. 444 (1934).
27. Id. at 598, 252 N.W. at 445. The court did not discuss whether
there was scienter on the part of the seller, but adopted the definition
of fraud set down in Helvetia Copper Co. v. Hart-Parr Co., 137 Minn. 321,
324, 163 N.W. 665, 667 (1917): "The representations were unqualified
and must be treated as assertions of fact within the knowledge of the
[seller], the falsity of which constitutes fraud as a matter of law."28. In Schlechter v. Felton, 134 Mim. 143, 147, 158 N.W. 813, 815
(1916), the court said:
The rule [liability for misrepresentation without scienter]
seems to us consonant with practical justice. It does the de-
fendant no injustice. If his information is not absolute,
[Vol. 54:846
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uncertain. There has been no indication as to how much spec-
ificity is required, and because of the nature of the problem,
this question may be difficult to resolve. The validity of a spe-
cific disclaimer has also been questioned on the ground that it
would allow a deliberate cheater to get away with fraud.29 This
criticism, however, loses force where the misrepresentation is
not deliberate.
No prior Minnesota case specifically deals with the effect
of a misrepresentation on a clause limiting liability. There are,
however, cases in Minnesota and in other jurisdictions that sup-
port the general rule that parties to a contract may "protect
themselves against liability resulting from their own negli-
gence."30  This general rule is reinforced by sections 2-718 and
2-719 of the Code which allow contracting parties to limit or
alter the measure of damages under Article 2. While these pro-
visions are not directly applicable because Article 2 does not
define the damages recoverable for misrepresentation, 81 the mis-
representations could be analogized to statements of fact which
constitute express warranties under section 2-313. Although sec-
tion 2-316 does not allow disclaimers of express warranties,
section 2-316 (4) provides that remedies for breach of warranty
(express or implied) may be limited in accordance with section
2-719.
A further analogy can be drawn to section 1-102(3) of the
Code by comparing the obligations of a seller under the Minne-
sota law of misrepresentation to the obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by the Code.
These obligations cannot be disclaimed but the parties may agree
upon reasonable standards for the performance of such obliga-
neither should his statement be. He can always protect him-
self by stating what is true-that is, that he has only a belief,
or by stating the source of his information.
Such a specific disclaimer, it is argued, is inconsistent with the con-
tention that the buyer relied upon that particular misrepresentation.
Danaan Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 321, 184 N.Y.S.2d 599, 602,
157 N.E.2d 597, 599 (1959).
29. Recent Developments, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 525, 527 (1959).
30. E.g., Independent School Dist. No. 877 v. Loberg Plumbing &
Heating Co., 266 Minn. 426, 434, 123 N.W.2d 793, 798 (1963). See also
Weirick v. Hamm Realty Co., 179 Minn. 25, 228 N.W. 175 (1929); Better
Food Markets, Inc. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 179, 253 P.2d
10 (1953); See Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 580 (1953). Cf. PROSSER, supra note
1, at 458-59.
31. Section 2-721 of the Code states that remedies for misrepresen-
tation "include" all the remedies available under Article 2, but does not
limit the remedies to those available thereunder.
19701
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tions. The policy suggested by this section would support a rule
which allows the parties to avoid the high standards imposed by
the Minnesota law of misrepresentation by specifically disclaim-
ig, or at least limiting, liability for innocent misrepresentation.
There are also policy reasons which support the argument
that to allow parties to limit liability is desirable. If the limiting
clause is within the scope of permissible agreement and the in-
tention of the parties is reasonably apparent, "public policy dic-
tates that they be bound by the agreement made."' 2  If the
agreement to limit liability was made when the parties were spe-
cifically thinking of the contingency of the failure of the con-
tract, it would seem that their anticipated damages would not
be dependent upon the reason for the failure. In addition, the
degree of fault warrants a narrower liability for nonintentional
than for intentional misrepresentation.
83
In denying validity to the disclaimer, Clements is in accord
with section 1-103 of the Code and the treatment of disclaimers
as exemplified by National Equipment Corporation v. Volden.
34
The result may possibly be avoided by the use of a specific dis-
claimer.8 5 The court, however, should have given effect to the
clause limiting liability. Such a result would fulfill the apparent
intent of the parties, and give effect to the policy suggested by
the Uniform Commercial Code.
While it is entirely proper for the court to generally ignore
distinctions between the various types of misrepresentations, dis-
tinctions ought to be drawn when a specific disclaimer or limita-
tion of liability clause is involved. Only when such clauses are
evaluated with respect to the seller's degree of fault can the
polices of the Code be given effect and a proper balance struck
between protecting the buyer and maintaining freedom of con-
tract.
32. Independent School Dist. No. 877 v. Loberg Plumbing & Heat-
ing Co., 266 Mlinn. 426, 434, 123 N.W.2d 793, '199 (1963).
33. See Lack Indus., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 327 F.2d 266, 278
(8th Cir. 1964).
34. 190 Minn. 596, 252 N.W. 444 (1934).
35. See text accompanying note 30 su*ra.
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Constitutional Law: Garnishment Without Notice
and Hearing is Denial of Due Process
Plaintiff instituted a garnishment action against defendant
and her employer as garnishee. The Wisconsin garnishment
statute did not specifically provide for any form of hearing prior
to the freezing of the wages.2 The garnishee's answer stated
that it controlled $63.18 of defendant's unpaid wages and that it
would pay one-half to petitioner as a subsistence allowance and
hold the other half subject to the order of the court.3  The
Wisconsin Supreme Court sustained the lower court's holding
that the garnishment procedure did not violate the due process
requirement of the fourteenth amendment.4 The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that absent notice and a prior
hearing, such garnishment procedure amounted to a deprivation
of property without due process of law, in violation of the four-
teenth amendment. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation,
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
Garnishment is a statutory proceeding whereby property,
money or credits controlled by a third party (the garnishee)
are subjected to a judgment or potential judgment against the
actual owner of the property. Thus, garnishment proceedings
are not independent actions, but are ancillary to the action estab-
lishing the debt.; Whoever prevails in the principal action ob-
tains the right to proceed against the garnishee for the collection
of the debt or ownership of the property." The most common
form of garnishment occurs where the property consists of the
1. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.04(1) (Supp. 1969).
2. The statute did, however, require the plaintiff to serve the
summons and complaint on the defendant within 10 days after service
on the garnishee. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.07 (1) (Supp. 1969).
3. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 267.18 (2) (a) (Supp. 1969) reads as follows:
When wages or salary are the subject of garnishment action,
the garnishee shall pay over to the principal defendant on the
date when such wages or salary would normally be payable a
subsistence allowance, out of the wages or salary then owing,
in the sum of $25 in the case of an individual without depend-
ents or $40 in the case of an individual with dependents;
but in no event in excess of 50 per cent of the wages or salary
owing. Said subsistence allowance shall be applied to the first
wages or salary earned in the period subject to said garnish-
ment action.
4. Family Fin. Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259
(1967).
5. Laborde v. Ubarri, 214 U.S. 173 (1909). See also Thomas v.
Hector Constr. Co., 216 Minn. 207, 12 N.W.2d 769 (1943).
6. See J. RoOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW Or GARNISHMENT § 1
(1896).
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earned wages of the principal defendant while they are still in
the hands of his garnishee-employer.
Traditionally, garnishment has been considered to be but a
form of attachment, since the latter remedy can reach property
controlled by the principal defendant in addition to that con-
trolled by third parties. Attachment, however, is usually sub-
ject to more stringent controls than is garnishment, for attach-
ment often requires a bond and is available only in limited cir-
cumstances. Even though the summary nature of the proceed-
ings makes garnishment more easily available and results in
stricter statutory construction, 7 many states do not have sep-
arate garnishment statutes; rather, general attachment proced-
ures are applied to garnishment actions.8
Since garnishment is exclusively a statutory remedy,9 each
state has separate and distinct laws and procedures relating to
wage garnishment.' 0 Three general approaches may be dis-
cerned. One approach prohibits any form of wage garnishment.
Pennsylvania, for example, statutorily exempts all unpaid wages
and salaries from garnishment." Texas accomplishes the same
result by constitutional provision.' 2 A second approach provides
creditors with a readily accessible garnishment procedure.' 3 The
former Minnesota statute is an example of this approach, requir-
ing as a prerequisite for garnishment proceedings only the filing
7. See Wood v. Bangs, 199 Minn. 208, 210, 271 N.W. 447, 448
(1937). The court stated that garnishment is not subject to the same
or similar safeguards as attachment proceedings; thus garnishment
statutes should be more strictly construed. Note that, historically, at-
tachment statutes are narrowly drawn and usually require a bond. See,
e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 570.02-.03 (1967).
8. See, e.g., Mi. RULEs OF PROc. rule G45 (1957); N.J. REv. STAT.§ 2A:26-2 (1952); S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-901 (1962).
9. Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U.S.
183 (1941); Gustafson v. Johnson, 235 Minn. 358, 51 N.W.2d 108 (1952).
10. See Brunn, Wage Garnishment in California: A Study and
Recommendations, 53 CAIzF. L. REv. 1214, 1250-53 (1965). Because
garnishment is solely a statutory remedy and since each statute is
unique in some aspect, authorities from other states have little value
without reference to the specific statute in question. Cf. Gustafson v.
Johnson, 235 Minn. 358, 51 N.W.2d 108 (1952).
11. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 886 (1966).
12. "No current wages for personal services shall ever be subject
to garnishment." TEx. CoNsT. art. 16, § 28 (1876).
13. See, e.g., ALAs. STAT. § 09.40.010 (1962); Am. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 12-1571 (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 31-501 (1947); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
77.01 (Supp. 1967); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 93.4301 (1947); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-09-07 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1171 (Supp. 1969);
S.D. COmP. LAws § 21-18-1 (1967); WAsEL REV. CODE ANN. § 7.32.010
(1961).
[Vol. 54:853
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of an action for the recovery of money.14 A third approach re-
quires the same prerequisites to garnish wages as required by
the typical attachment statute.15 The new Minnesota statute
falls into this classification. The statute allows garnishment
only after judgment or default except for the purpose of estab-
lishing quasi in rem jurisdiction or when the garnishee may be
liable as guarantor or insurer for the claim asserted against the
debtor in the principal action.' 6 If garnishment is allowed, the
14. MnN. STAT. § 571.41 (1967).
15. Even though over 30 states have been included in this third
category, it is the opinion of the writer that 25 or more of these states
have one or more grounds available to reach employees' wages that will
probably not conform to the standards set down in Sniadach. See, e.g.,
CAL. Civ. P. § 537 (West Supp. 1968); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-9-1(1963); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-701 (1963); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 521.010(1949); NEB. REv. STAT. § 31.010 (1967); N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A:26-2(1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 26-1-1 (1953); ORE. REV. STAT. § 29.110(1968); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-7-15, 38-7-2 (1966).
16. MINN. STAT. § 571.41 (1967), as amended, (MINN. SESs. L.
Saav. ch. 1142 (1969)):
571.41 GARNSHEE sUMMoNs; EXCEPTIONS
Subdivision 1. In any action in a court of record or justice
court for the recovery of money at any time after default
following service of the pleadings upon a party to the main
action, unless an answer or reply has been interposed or after
the judgment therein against the defendant, a garnishee sum-
mons may be issued against any third person as provided in
this chapter. The judgment creditor and judgment debtor shall
be so designated and the person against whom the summons
issues shall be designated garnishee. Any individual, partner-
ship or corporation within the state having property subject to
garnishment may be named as garnishee. Notwithstanding any-
thing to the contrary herein contained, a plaintiff in any action
in a court of record or justice court for the recovery of money
may issue a garnishee summons before judgment therein if,
upon application to the court, it shall appear that defendant is
about to take property out of the state which might be necessary
to satisfy any judgment awarded plaintiff and if the court shall
order the issuance of such summons. If such an order shall issue
such summons and attendant documents shall designate the
parties plaintiff and defendant, respectively.
Subd. 2. Garnishment shall be permitted before judgment in
the following instances only:(1) For the purpose of establishing quasi in rem jurisdiction(a) when the defendant is a resident individual having
departed from the state with intent to defraud his cred-
tors or to avoid service or keeps himself concealed with
like intent; or(b) the defendant is a resident individual who has de-parted from the state, or cannot be found therein, or(c) the defendant is a nonresident individual, or a
foreign corporation, partnership or association.(2) When the garnishee and the debtor are parties to a con-
tract of suretyship, guarantee, or insurance, because of which
the garnishee may be held to respond to any person for the
claim asserted against the debtor in the main action.
Subd. 3. In the instances where garnishment is permitted be-
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plaintiff is restricted as to the amount of wages which may be
reached,17 and under certain circumstances, the debtor's wages
may be exempt from garnishment.'8
The results under prejudgment garnishment statutes have
been characterized as vicious, allowing "loan sharks and collec-
tion agencies practically to blackmail a debtor by tying up his
wages in advance of proving the validity of their claim, and
without prior notice of intent to attach."'19 Commentators have
stated that such practices might well lead to bankruptcy 20 and
loss of the principal defendant's job.21 There are those, how-
ever, that believe in the necessity of a prejudgment garnish-
ment procedure. Without prejudgment garnishment, the de-
fendant in the principal suit could collect his wages, quit his
job and either leave the jurisdiction or move-thus rendering the
expenses of collection prohibitive.22
Two state supreme courts had held that prejudgment gar-
nishment or attachment was not violative of due process. In
Byrd v. Rector,23 the West Virginia court held that due process
was not violated because there had been no deprivation of prop-
erty.24 The court reasoned that the p:.operty subject to garnish-
ment is detained only temporarily and if judgment is later ren-
fore the entry of judgment the parties for the purposes of this
act will be known as judgment debtor or judgment creditor
respectively.
17. MINN. STAT. § 571.41 (1967), at. amended, (MINN. SEss. L.
SERv. ch. 1142 (1969)) limits garnishment to (1) an amount equal to
eight times the number of business days and paid holidays (not to ex-
ceed five per calendar week) in the pay period, multiplied by the fed-
eral minimum hourly wage then in effect, or (2) 75 percent of the
"disposable earnings" during the pay period, whichever is greater. Cf.
15 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. IV, 1969), discussed at note 41 infra.
18. MINN. STAT. § 571.41 (1967), as amended, (MnM. SESS. L.
SEav. ch. 1142 (1969)) provides that one who has been a recipient of
relief based upon need or an inmate of a state correctional institution
shall, upon his return to private employment, be exempt from garnish-
ment for six months.
19. Note, Garnishment in Kentucky--Some Defects, 45 KY. L.J.
322, 327-28 (1956-57), quoting a letter written by Robert Caldwell, Esq.,
of the firm of Caldwell and Robinson, Ashland, Kentucky.
20. See Brunn, supra note 10, at 1236.
21. Comment, Wage Garnishment as a Collection Device, 1967 Wis.
L. REV. 759, 761; Comment, Wage Garnishment in Washington-An
Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. REv. 743, 756-58, 765 (1968).
22. Legislation, Garnishment in Florida: Analysis, Assessment,
and Proposals, 19 U. FLA. L. REV. 99, 102 (1966).
23. 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932).
24. Id. at 198, 163 S.E. at 848. The court could have decided the
constitutional issue on the fact that defendants were nonresidents and
in personam jurisdiction was unQbtainable, I(. at 198, 163 S.E. at 848.
[Vol. 54:853
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dered, the deprivation is the result of that judgment. Thus, the
deprivation, if any, will occur only after defendant has had full
opportunity to be heard in defense of the claim.
In McInnes v. McKay,25 the Maine court upheld the con-
stitutionality of a prejudgment attachment procedure. Even
though the court dealt with attachment rather than garnish-
ment, the procedures involved are so similar that certain com-
parisons can be drawn.26 The court stated that it did not con-
sider the attachment to be a deprivation of property within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment since the procedure was
merely conditional and temporary.27 The court further stated
that if there were a deprivation of property, it was not without
due process since the attachment was merely a part of a process
affording both notice and an opportunity to be heard before final
deprivation could occur.28 The United States Supreme Court af-
firmed McInnes per curiam2 9 on the basis of two prior decisions,30
neither of which were factually similar to McInnes. It is appar-
ent that the Court considered due process requirements in sum-
mary proceedings in general rather than specific terms. Prior
to Snriadach, the Court had never addressed itself to the precise
question of whether prejudgment wage garnishment-specifi-
cally, the interim freezing of wages without a hearing-violated
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court, per Justice Douglas, reasoned that a procedure
that might satisfy due process requirements for attachments in
general does not necessarily satisfy procedural due process re-
quirements in all cases.31 The Court pointed out the hardships
25. 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928).
26. The Sniadach Court recognized such similarities. See 395 U.S.
at 340.
27. 127 Me. at 116, 141 A. at 702.
28. Id. at 116, 141 A. at 702.
29. 279 U.S. 820 (1928).
30. Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); Ownbey v.
Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921). Coffin Bros. concerned the foreclosure of a
lien on the value of the defendant's ownership in bank stock. Ownbey
concerned foreign attachment and the requirement of special bail or
surety's undertaking as a prerequisite before the defendant could appear
and contest on the merits. The McInnes Court apparently felt that al-
though the facts of Ownbey and Coffin Bros. were not similar to McInnes,
the summary procedures involved concerned the same questions as to
procedural due process and thus the cases were valid precedent. The
Sniadac Court distinguished these cases because it determined that the
end results of the procedure outweighed the procedure itself, and more
importantly, that the procedure in the case could not be separated from
the type of property involved.
31. 395 U.S. at 340.
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that might result from prejudgment. wage garnishment. The
loss of income might well deprive the wage earner's family of
adequate clothing and other necessities. In addition, the wage
earner might face the loss of his job and other sources of in-
come. Because of these severe hardships, the Court found an
obvious deprivation of property. Since notice and prior hearing
were not required by the statute, the Court held that funda-
mental principles of due process were violated.
The Court distinguished four decisions other than McInnes
by briefly stating that the cases involved "special protection to
a state or creditor interest" and thus due process could have been
satisfied by a summary procedure.32 Coffin Brothers v. Ben-
nett33 and Fahey v. Mallonee34 both concerned regulation of the
banking business. Ownbey v. Morgan,3 5 which concerned foreign
attachments and Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Incorpo-
rated,36 which concerned procedures under the Food and Drug
Act, also presented special situations. There is no question that
each of these cases can be easily distinguished from Sniadach in
the sense that different assets and defendants were involved. The
procedures involved, however, are similar and should not be dis-
tinguished so readily. All of the cases involve the prejudgment
freezing of an asset without prior hearing, and regardless of the
nature of the asset-whether it be stock in a corporation, money
in a bank account or unearned wages of a defendant-a finding of
lack of procedural due process in one would seem to require the
same finding in another. The Court in Sniadach obviously dis-
agreed, and felt that a balancing process should be utilized at
least as far as wages are concerned. The Court balanced Wis-
consin's legislative determination that creditors need garnish-
ment protection with the possibly severe harm that might re-
sult from the procedure and determined that the latter out-
weighed the former.
It is apparent that prejudgment wage garnishment statutes
"of the Wisconsin type" will be considered unconstitutional un-
der Sniadach. The problem facing many state legislatures to-
day is what exactly was meant by "prejudgment garnishment of
the Wisconsin type?" 37  Since the decision did not declare all
32. Id. at 339.
33. 277 U.S. 29 (1928).
34. 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
35. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
36. 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
37. 395 U.S. at 341. The Minnesota statute in effect before the re-
cent amendments to the garnishment statutes was MiNN. STAT. § 571.41
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wage garnishment unconstitutional, it must be assumed that a
statute could survive if the procedural defects were corrected
by providing for notice and hearing. The problem of notice is
merely a statutory formality which can easily be cured. The
more difficult question is whether a full trial on the merits
must precede garnishment or whether some proceeding short of
a full trial will suffice. It is likely that a number of states
will establish a procedure whereby prejudgment wage garnish-
ment may be initiated upon a showing of probable cause. Such
action would be initiated by the plaintiff, and the defendant
would be notified and given an opportunity to be heard. This
type of procedure would parallel the preliminary hearing in
criminal law and might satisfy the objections raised by the Court
but it is likely that many of these hearings would establish
probable cause only by default-the defendant failing to appear.
The Court determined only that prejudgment wage garnishment,
or at least the threat of such, was the evil it had to eliminate.
This has been the real club in the hands of creditors38 and it is
thus far unclear what constitutional limits will be set.
Although the Court placed a great deal of emphasis upon
the social and economic hardships caused by wage garnishment,
it is unlikely that the Court would accept a statute merely pro-
viding greater exemptions for subsistence wages. Even though
all states have some type of exemption from wage garnishment, 39
no mention of this was made by the Supreme Court. Further-
more, the Court was well aware of the Truth in Lending Act 40
since it cited section 1674, which forbids discharge from em-
ployment because of garnishment. The Court completely ne-
glected, however, to mention section 1673 of the Act which will
establish a minimum garnishment exemption for all state stat-
utes. 4 1 It seems certain, therefore, that providing higher exemp-
tions will not correct the procedural problems involved.42
(1967). This statute is certainly "of the Wisconsin type" as stated in
Sniadach because of the total lack of protective standards and the ease
with which the remedy is available.
38. See Comment, Wage Garnishment in Washington, supra note
21, at 749-54.
39. See Brunn, supra note 10, at 1250-53.
40. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV, 1969).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (Supp. IV, 1969) provides that the amount
of an individual's aggregate disposable earnings subject to garnish-
ment may not exceed the lesser of (1) 25 percent of his disposable
earnings, or (2) the amount by which his disposable earnings exceed
30 times the federal minimum hourly wage then in effect.
42. Following the same reasoning, it would seem that the elimina-
tion of other hardships, such as forcing new payment schedules or
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Another question presented by Sniadach is the future valid-
ity of prejudgment attachment of personal property other than
wages. The Court placed great emphasis upon socio-economic
statements43 concerning wage garnishment. Consequently, it
seems clear that the Court intended to limit the scope of the de-
cision solely to wages. The opinion stated: "We deal here with
wages-a specialized type of property presenting distinct prob-
lems in our economic system."44 The Court indicated that wages
were unique in presenting severe economic abuses when treated
with a summary procedure. This might imply that similar gar-
nishment of a different form of property, such as that involved
in McInnes, would not be unconstitutional. The Court could,
however, enlarge the scope of its decision and focus solely on the
procedures provided by the statute. Sniadach established that a
temporary freezing is a deprivation of property within the mean-
ing of procedural due process. The only step remaining is to
extend this rule to all forms of property, and McInnes will be
overruled. 45
A similar result might follow where attachment or garnish-
ment is used to establish quasi in rem jurisdiction. The re-
cently passed Minnesota garnishment statute deserves attention
here.46 Subdivision 2 not only permits garnishment before judg-
ment but literally before commencement of the main action for
the purpose of establishing quasi in rein jurisdiction. Subsections
of this statute limit the use of the remedy, but at least one pro-
vision might prove unconstitutional. Subdivision 2(1) (c) allows
garnishment before judgment if the defendant is a nonresident
collection fees on the debtor, would not correct an otherwise unconstitu-
tional statute under Sniadach. Danger of loss of job will be eliminated
on July 1, 1970, under section 1674 of the Truth in Lending Act.
43. See 395 U.S. at 341 n.6.
44. Id. at 340.
45. At least two state courts have taken this step, either antici-
pating an extension of Sniadach or ignoring the special emphasis placed
upon wage garnishment in the decision. In Arnold v. Knettle, - Ariz.
-, 460 P.2d 45 (1969), the court struck down two writs of garnishment.
Only one of these writs garnished wages; the other was on a debt on
accounts receivable. The Arizona court based its decision on the simi-
larities between Aaoz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1571 (1956) and the Wis-
consin statute struck down in Sniadach. The court looked only to the
similarities in procedures and did not mention the wage distinction.
In Larson v. Fetherston, - Wis. -, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969), the Wiscon-
sin court noted the fact that Sniadach made reference only to wages,
but stated that no valid distinction could be made between garnishment
of wages and other property. The court decided that a due process
violation should not depend upon the type of property but upon the
procedure involved.
46. See note 16 supra.
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individual or a foreign corporation, partnership or association.
Sniadach seemed to indicate that such a statute would be con-
stitutional as to a nonresident only if in personam jurisdiction
was not readily obtainable. 47 The Minnesota statute makes no
mention of this requirement and consequently could run into
constitutional difficulty.
Subdivision 2(2) is of interest in a nonwage context. Pre-
judgment garnishment is allowed when the garnishee and
the debtor are parties to a contract of suretyship, guarantee or
insurance. An example of this might be a garnishment based
on the obligation of the insurance carrier to defend the claim
brought against the principal defendant. An extension of Sni-
adach would make this practice one of questionable constitution-
ality without proper notice and hearing.
There are other provisions of doubtful constitutionality
within the statute. Subdivision 1 states that a garnishment
summons may be issued before judgment if it "shall appear"
that the defendant is about to take property which might be re-
quired to satisfy the potential judgment out of the state. To
avoid abuse of this section, a court must clearly require more
than a mere allegation that the debtor will abscond. The stat-
ute does not, however, indicate what showing is necessary.
Other sections have similar potentially abusive features. It
is unclear what must be proved to show intent to defraud or
avoid service under subdivision 2(1) (a). Another area of con-
cern is the extent of the search the plaintiff must make be-
fore the court will decide that the defendant cannot be found
within the state under subdivision 2(1)(b). Both of these
sections are vague, and perhaps intentionally so. But since the
Supreme Court has decided that wages and wage garnishment
are special areas of constitutional concern, revision of the statute
may be necessary.
One remaining problem surrounding the decision in Snia-
dach concerns the legal processes that were utilized to achieve
the result. It might be argued that the determination of which
creditor interests should receive special protection is a legislative
rather than judicial function. On this basis, the decision is sub-
ject to attack as an unwarranted intrusion by the judiciary into
legislative prerogatives. Although the Court stated that it does
not sit as a "super-legislative body,"48 the decision appears to be
based upon reasoning which Justice Black, in dissent, called a
47. 395 U.S. at 339.
48. Id.
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usurpation of legislative power.49 In. reaching its decision, the
Court did not rely upon valid precedent or legal reasoning as
such but rather upon what Justice Black termed "emotional
rhetoric." 50  The decision is concerned with the imposition of
what the Court called "a most inhuman doctrine"51 that "may
as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall.15 2
The Court emphasized the "tremendous hardship on wage earn-
ers with families to support"53 and the fact that the "debtor will
be under considerable pressure to pay the debt and collection
charges in order to get his wages back.. 54
Snadach will relieve many of the present hardships result-
ing from wage garnishment. The decision might, however, de-
clare state laws unconstitutional in 40 or more states. 5 Since
Congress had recently acted in the field, 56 and consumer protec-
tion measures had been drafted into the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code,57 the Court would have been wise to hesitate before
replacing Wisconsin's expressed legislative policy with its own.
It has been over 60 years since the Court stated: "To what ac-
tions the remedy of attachment may be given is for the legis-
lature of a State to determine and its courts to decide . . 58
Similarly, in 1941 the Court stated:
We are not concerned ... with the wisdom, need or appropri-
ateness of the legislation. Differences of opinion on that score
suggest a choice which should be left where . . . it was left
by the Constitution-to the States and to Congress.5 9
As stated by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion,60 the
49. Id. at 345.
50. Id. at 344.
51. Id. at 340, citing 114 CONG. REC. 11688 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1968)
(remarks of Congressman Reuss).
52. Id. at 341-42.
53. Id. at 340.
54. Id. at 341, citing Comment, Wage Garnishment in Washington,
supra note 21, at 753.
55. See statutes cited in notes 13 & 15 supra.
56. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV, 1969).
57. Section 5.104 prohibits garnishment prior to judgment and sec-
tion 5.106 prohibits discharge from employment for reason of employee
garnishment. Section 5.105, which sets maximum amounts subject to
garnishment, provides that the aggregate disposable earnings of an indi-
vidual for any workweek subject to garnishment arising from a con-
sumer credit sale, consumer lease or consumer loan shall not exceed
the lesser of (1) 25 percent of his disposable earnings for that week, or
(2) the amount by which his disposable earnings exceed 40 times the
then existing federal minimum hourly wage.
58. Rothschild v. Knight, 184 U.S. 334, 341 (1902).
59. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941).
60. 395 U.S. at 343.
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thrust of past cases dealing with procedural due process has
centered about the notice and hearing required before any depri-
vation of property can occur. Upon examination of the cases
cited,6 1 it becomes apparent that the Court in Sniadach is using
a constitutional amendment aimed at curing procedural defects
to alleviate socio-economic hardships. The most important issue
to arise out of Sniadach may prove to be what Justice Black de-
scribed as the ". . . plain, judicial usurpation of state legislative
power to decide what the State laws shall be."'62
61. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950);
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Opp Cotton Mills v. Ad-
ministrator, 312 U.S. 126 (1941); United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co.,
291 U.S. 457 (1934); Coffin Bros v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928); Ownbey
v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Londoner v. City & County of Denver,
210 U.S. 373 (1908).
62. 395 U.S. at 345.
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Constitutional Law: Property Ownership Requirement in
School Board Election Is Denial cf Equal Protection
Petitioner, a bachelor living with his parents, was denied the
right to vote in a local school board election because he did not
satisfy the voting requirements imposed by section 2012 of the
New York Education Law.' This statute provides that, in certain
New York school districts, residents who satisfy the necessary
age, citizenship and residency requirements may vote in the
local school district election only if they also (1) own or lease
taxable real property within the district or (2) are parents or
have custody of children enrolled in the local public schools.
Asserting that he was affected by and interested in the results
of these school district elections,2 petitioner brought suit in fed-
eral district court, alleging that section 2012 denied him equal
protection of the law in violation of the fourteenth amendment.-,
A three-judge court held section 2012 constitutional and dis-
missed the complaint.4 On direct appeal, the United States Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that section 2012 denied peti-
tioner equal protection of the law in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. Kramer v. Union Free School District Number 15,
395 U.S. 621 (1969).
The concept of classification is inherent in the nature of
statutory law. Since the very idea of classification is unequal
treatment, laws will affect different classes of people in different
ways." The Supreme Court has evolved a "traditional test" un-
der which a legislative classification is unconstitutional only if
1. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 2012 (McKinney 1953), as amended, (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1968).
2. The school board, like all school boards where section 2012 is
applicable, not only prescribes textbooks and courses of study, but also
formulates the school budget which is then submitted for approval to
the qualified district voters in the same annual local election in
which petitioner was denied the right to vote. N.Y. EDuc. LAW §§
1709, 2021, 2022 (McKinney 1953).
3. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 259 F. Supp. 164
(E.D.N.Y. 1966). The district court dismissed Kramer's complaint on
the merits and denied his motion to convene a three-judge court to
adjudicate the purported constitutional issue. On appeal, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that appel-
lant's complaint warranted convening a three-judge court. Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 379 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1967).
4. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 282 F. Supp. 70
(E.D.N.Y. 1968). There was a dissenting opinion written by Judge
Weinstein. See text accompanying note 34 infra.
5. See Tressman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 CAiaF. L. REv. 341, 344 (1949).
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it is based on grounds completely irrelevant to the purpose of
the classification.6
In the area of voting rights, however, the Court has recently
departed from the use of the "traditional test" in determining
the constitutionality of a legislative classification. The depar-
ture began when a stricter test of equal protection was applied
by the Supreme Court in the 1964 apportionment case of Rey-
nolds v. Sims. 7 The Court announced that the equal protection
clause demanded that a statute denying the exercise of the fran-
chise to some and granting its exercise to others "must be care-
fully and meticulously scrutinized" to determine whether it fur-
thers a valid state interest.8 The extent of the departure was
in doubt for one year however, for the Court refused to extend
the stricter test to a voting case not involving apportionment in
Carrington v. Rash.9 The Court refused to explicitly apply either
test and merely ruled that the particular classification was not
6. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961),
where the Court concluded that Maryland's Sunday Closing Laws did
not violate the equal protection clause. McGowan is typical of the
application of the "traditional test." Generally, the test has been that
a legislative classification does not violate the equal protection clause
so long as its relationship to the state's purpose is not "irrational,"
"irrelevant," "unreasonable," "arbitrary" or "invidious." Harper v. Vir-
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 673-74 (1966) (Black, J. dissenting).
Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959),
applied the "traditional test."
7. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In this case the voters in several Ala-
bama counties brought suit, alleging that malapportionment of the
Alabama legislature deprived them of equal protection of the law under
both the United States and Alabama constitutions. The Court held that
the representatives of both houses must be apportioned by population.
See Note, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HAxv. L. REv. 179, 248
(1964) and Note, Apportionment, 43 TEx. L. REv. 236 (1964). Among
the other reapportionment cases which were decided similarly and on
the same day as Reynolds are WMVMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 633
(1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S.
656 (1964), and Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713
(1964).
8. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964). This same test,
however, had been previously applied by the Court when the basis of
classification was inherently suspect (such as race) regardless of the
subject matter of the statute (i.e., these cases are exceptions to the
general equal protection case where the "traditional test" is applied).
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (race);
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 (1948) (alienage);
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948) (nationality).
9. 380 U.S. 89 (1965). The case involved a provision of the
Texas constitution which barred all servicemen who had moved to
Texas during their military service from voting in any state election
while they remained members of the armed forces.
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"creasonable."10
The Court's reluctance to extend the use of the stricter test
to a nonapportionment voting rights case ended with the 1966
case of Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections," invalidating a
poll tax requirement in an election of state representatives. The
Court, applying the stricter test, concluded that "where funda-
mental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them
must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined."'12 Thus,
prior to Kramer, the Court had applied the stricter test of equal
protection only in the apportionment cases and in a case involv-
ing a state legislative election.
The Court in Kramer, applying the stricter test, held that
the additional voting requirements of the New York statute3
deprived an otherwise qualified voter of equal protection guar-
anteed by the fourteenth amendmen. The Court justified its
application of the stricter test by reasoning that the close scru-
tiny given to state apportionment statutes which merely dilute
the citizen's vote should a fortiori require close scrutiny of a
statute which denies the franchise. The close examination of the
statute would, in turn, reveal whether the classification is in fact
necessary to promote a valid state interest.' 4
The Court concluded that the traditional test was inappro-
priate by reasoning first that Harper is controlling 5 and second,
10. The Court, without citing any of the then recent "apportion-
ment" cases and without explicitly applying the stricter standard of
equal protection announced in those cases, reasoned that the Texas pro-
vision was not a "reasonable residence restriction." Although the Court
stated that the right to vote was "close to the core of our constitutional
system," it did not say explicitly whether a "reasonable classification"
was something different than a rational classification. At this point it
was evident that the Court had hedged the question as to which
standard to apply. Apparently, the Court was reluctant to differenti-
ate apportionment cases and cases involving state voter qualifications.
380 U.S. 89, 91-96 (1965).
11. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See Comment, 28 Onio ST. L.J. 189
(1967) for a good discussion of the case.
12. 383 U.S. at 670. The majority rejected the dissenters' argu-
ments that the traditional test should be applied and that the poll tax
should be upheld because there exists a rational relationship between
the tax and the voting right-namely, that those who pay poll taxes are
more interested in furthering the well-being of the state.
13. See note 1 supra.
14. 395 U.S. at 626.
15. Id. at 628. As the dissent notes, however, Harper dealt
with a state legislative election while Kramer dealt with a "special-
purpose" type of election. Id. at 640 n.10.
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that the traditional test rests on the assumption that "the insti-
tutions of state government are structured so as to represent
fairly all the people."' 6 Thus, when the "challenge to the statute
is in effect a challenge of this basic assumption, the assumption
can no longer serve as the basis for presuming constitution-
ality.,,17
The Court then considered the issue of whether section 2012
was necessary to promote a legitimate state interest. The state
argued that the purpose of the classification was to limit the
vote to those citizens who were "primarily interested" in school
affairs. The Court, without reaching the question of whether or
not the state's purpose was a "compelling" one, held that the clas-
sification did not accomplish this purpose with sufficient preci-
sion to justify denying appellant the franchise.' The Court
concluded that section 2012 would permit people who are disin-
terested in the outcome to vote, while disenfranchising persons
such as petitioner who are sincerely and directly interested in
the outcome of such elections.19
The dissent20 maintained that the traditional test should
have been applied since the majority's justification for the appli-
cation of the stricter test was erroneous in two respects-Harper
was not controlling 2' and the "state government" was fairly
structured. It responded to the majority's assertion that the as-
sumption upon which the traditional test rests was in effect being
challenged by petitioner's arguments, by stating that there is
"no claim whatever here that the state government is not struc-
tured so as to represent fairly all the people."22 In support of
this statement, they reasoned that since section 2012 was pro-
mulgated by the state legislature and not the school district and
since petitioner could still vote in the state legislative election,
16. Id. at 628. The dissent used the words "state government"
instead of "the institutions of state government" when it attacked the
majority's reasoning. Id. at 639. See text accompanying note 32 infra.
17. Id. at 628.
18. Id. at 633.
19. For example, appellant resides with his parents in the
school district, pays state and federal taxes and is interested
in and affected by school board decisions; however, he has no
vote. On the other hand, an uninterested unemployed young
man who pays no state or federal taxes, but who rents an
apartment in the district, can participate in the election.
Id. at 632 n.15.
20. The dissenting opinion was written by Justice Stewart, joined
by Justices Black and Harlan.
21. See note 15 supra.
22. 395 U.S. at 639.
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he was not being "locked into any self-perpetuating status of
exclusion from the electoral process. '2 The dissent concluded
that section 2012 should be upheld under the traditional test
since it was as rational a classification as those admittedly valid
-age, residency and literacy.24
While the dissent's reasoning may at first appear to be plaus-
ible, a closer examination indicates its weaknesses. First, the
analogy of the section 2012 classification to age, residency and
literacy qualifications 25 is without solid support. For exam-
ple, the requirement of a reasonable voting age is clearly dif-
ferent from the requirements of owning or leasing real property
or having children enrolled in local schools. A minor will come
of voting age through a natural process, but a voter in appellant's
position must take affirmative action to satisfy the additional
voting requirements of section 2012. Hence, the minor is ex-
cluded only temporarily whereas appellant is excluded for an
indefinite period of time and perhaps a lifetime. The dissent's
analogy of the section 2012 requirements to residency and liter-
acy requirements is weakened by the fact that the cases involv-
ing residency26 and literacy requirements 27 were decided before
the stricter standard was extended to nonapportionment voting
rights cases. 28 If those cases were now to come before the Su-
preme Court, it is quite probable that the newer standard of
equal protection would be applied.2 This is not to say that
different results would be reached-only that a different method
23. Id. at 640.
24. Id. at 637.
25. Id. at 637-41.
26. E.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); Pope v. Williams,
193 U.S. 621 (1904).
27. The most recent literacy case is Lassiter v. Northampton
County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959). See note 6 supra.
28. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) was
the first case to apply the stricter test of equal protection to state voting
requirements.
29. The stricter standard was first announced in 1964 in Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), an apportionment case. Its first applica-
tion outside the apportionment field came in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), where it was applied to state voting
requirements in a state election. The Court had had the opportunity to
apply the new standard in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) but,
as previously discussed (see text accompanying note 10 supra), the Court
declined to explicitly use either the traditional or the stricter test and
instead hedged the question-deferring the question for one year until
Harper. That hedging in Carrington, together with the explicit use of
the stricter test one year later in Harper, is a strong indication that the
Court will not use the traditional test in future voting rights cases.
[Vol. 54:864
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would be applied to decide each of the cases.
The dissent's second argument-that the majority's justifi-
cation for applying the stricter standard of equal protection was
erroneous-is also open to rebuttal,30 even though it may be true,
as the dissent observes, that Harper is not necessarily control-
ling.31 The majority stated that "the institutions of state gov-
ernment" were structured unfairly.3 2 In support of its claim,
the majority reasoned that although section 2012 was enacted by
the state legislature, it nevertheless delegated decision-making
to people who are elected by only a portion of those eligible to
vote in the legislative elections. The majority considered such
a delegation to be tantamount to a denial of the franchise at the
legislative level.3 3 Thus, the dissent did not address itself to
the issue discussed by the majority.
Moreover, two important rationales, unmentioned in the
opinion, can be advanced to refute the minority's assertions.
First, to deprive petitioner and others similarly situated from
voting in school district elections is tantamount to depriving
such persons of control over the matters which the school board
decides. Thus a very important state institution becomes un-
fairly structured. The minority's second argument-that the
state government is fairly structured since petitioner can still
vote in the state legislative elections-is open to a further objec-
tion. The minority's view overlooks the fact that if a voter is
denied the vote in school district elections, he is also denied a
significant degree of control over government as a whole.34
Local school boards exercise a considerable part of that political
power which has been diffused among the various levels of gov-
ernment.3 5 For example, since state and federal governments
are major sources of revenue for local schools, a denial to peti-
tioner of his vote in school district elections is equivalent to a
denial of equal control over the expenditure of tax money col-
30. 395 U.S. at 638-39.
31. See note 15 supra.
32. 395 U.S. at 628.
33. Legislation which delegates decision making to bodies
elected by only a portion of those eligible to vote for the
legislature can cause unfair representation. Such legislation
can exclude a minority of voters from any voice in the de-
cisions just as effectively as if the decisions were made by
legislators the minority had no voice in selecting.
Id.
34. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 282 F. Supp.
70, 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
35. Id.
19701
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
lected by the state and federal governments.30
While the majority's holding is justified on the basis of the
foregoing analysis, the Court leaves a number of crucial ques-
tions unanswered. For example, the Court gives no indication
of what constitutes a "state institution" which now must be
fairly structured so as to represent all the people. Further, it is
unclear in what other types of "special elections" Kramer would
be controlling. The fact that the Court did not utilize available
arguments 37 relating specifically to the nature of the educational
system tends to indicate that it did not wish to limit the
precedential value of this case to an education election. More-
over, the companion case of Cipriano v. City of Houma3s makes
it quite clear that Kramer will be applied in future cases dealing
with other types of special elections.3 9
Another question Kramer leaves unanswered is whether the
state's purpose in limiting the franchise to those "primarily in-
terested"40 is itself a "compelling state interest." Since the Court
did not reach the issue of the nature of a "compelling state
interest," Kramer does not indicate what voter requirements a
state may legitimately impose. It only indicates that if a state
does impose restrictions those restrictions must be tailored with
"sufficient precision" to justify the denial of the franchise.41
Finally, it is unclear how precise the statute must be in
order to meet the Court's standard of "sufficiently tailored." The
Court's only indication of the degree of precision required under
the stricter test is its statement that "the classifications of sec-
tion 2012 permit inclusion of many persons who have, at best, a
remote and indirect interest in school affairs and on the other
36. Id. at 77.
37. The Court never discussed the importance of our educational
system nor did it utilize any of the arguments of the dissenting judge
in the district court. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
38. 395 U.S. 701 (1969). In Cipriano the Court, citing Kramer
for the application of the stricter test of equal protection, found that a
Louisiana statute which gave only "property taxpayers" the right to
vote in elections called to approve the issuance of revenue bonds by a
municipal utility violated the fourteenth amendment. Justices Black
and Stewart concurred in the result but applied the traditional test and
concluded that "this case involves a voting classification 'wholly irrele-
vant to achievement' of the State's objective."
39. Cipriano involved a bond election, and like Kramer, the Court
never reached the issue whether the state's purpose in limiting the
vote to those property owners who had a "special pecuniary interest"
was itself a compelling state interest. 395 U.S. 701, 703 (1969).
40. 395 U.S. at 632.
41. Id. at 633.
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hand, exclude others who have a distinct and direct interest in
the school meeting decisions.1
42
These unanswered questions illustrate the weakness of the
stricter test for equal protection. It is very difficult to apply
and thus prediction of which legislative classifications, if any,
could meet the requirements of this test is hazardous. Under
the traditional test the Court had merely to find some rational
relationship between the classification and the state's purpose in
order to uphold the statute. Under the stricter test, the Court
will have to find that the relationship is not only rational but
also that it is so precise and the statute's purpose so compelling
as to justify denial of the franchise.
The result reached in Kramer is justified because of the im-
portance of our educational system to the very functioning of
our society. Further, Kramer makes it clear 48 that the stricter
test of equal protection will be applied in future voting rights
cases. However, since this decision fails to indicate what is
meant by "sufficiently tailored" and thereby fails to mark the
limits of this stricter test, the decisions will likely lead to further
uncertainty and unpredictability in the results of future voting
rights cases.
42. Id. at 632.
43. See note 39 supra.
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Patent Law: Licensee Not Estopped From Asserting
Invalidity of His Licensor's Patent
Petitioner, Adkins, was hired by respondent, Lear, Incorpo-
rated, to invent an improved gyroscope for use in the aviation
industry. Adkins subsequently invented a gyroscope and applied
for a patent on it. Pursuant to their employment contract, Ad-
kins granted an exclusive license to Lear for patent use and
production "know-how." Prior to patent issuance, Lear stopped
making royalty payments and Adkins promptly brought suit
to collect royalties allegedly due. Lear defended on the ground
that the patent was invalid. The trial court directed a ver-
dict for Adkins holding that by its licensing agreement Lear
was estopped from asserting the invalidity of the patent.' The
California Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner should re-
cover royalties based on the license agreement up to the date
that respondent announced its intention to terminate payments,
regardless of the patent's validity. Any damages after that date,
according to the court, must be obtained through an action for
infringement. 2 The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's use of licensee estoppel and held that royalties were to
be paid.3 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that in a licensor's suit to collect agreed-upon royalties, a licensee
will not be estopped from attacking the validity of his licensor's
patent, and may avoid payment of royalties by proving the patent
is invalid. Lear, Incorporated v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).4
1. Although the trial court invoked the doctrine of licensee
estoppel in regard to gyros manufactured in Lear's California plant, a
different approach was used for the gyros :manufactured in Lear's Michi-
gan plant. Noting Lear's claim that it had developed its Michigan
designs independently of Adkins' ideas, the court instructed the jury to
find for the inventor only if it was satisfied that Adkins' invention was
novel within the meaning of the federal patent laws. The jury so found
and returned a verdict for Adkins on the Michigan gyros. The court,
however, having found that it was not novel, granted Lear's motion forjudgment notwithstanding the verdict. Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 52 Cal.
Rptr. 795, 801 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966).
2. Id. Under the contract principles applied by this court, no
distinction was made between the California gyros and the Michigan
gyros.
3. Adkins v. Lear, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 882, 435 P.2d 321, 64 Cal. Rptr.
545 (1967). The court applied the same test as the trial court in regard
to the Michigan gyros, but overruled that court's finding that Adkins'
invention was not novel, and awarded Adkins royalties for their manu-
facture.
4. The Court remanded the question of the liability of Lear on
the Michigan gyros to the California Supreme Court to be determined
in conjunction with the ruling on the patent's validity. 395 U.S. at 676.
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The doctrine of licensee estoppel was born in 1846 when the
Circuit Court of Massachusetts analogized a licensing agreement
to a land lease agreement.5 The court ruled that the long estab-
lished principles of the landlord-tenant relationship were equally
applicable to licensing, and thus the licensee must pay royalties
as long as he obtains the quiet enjoyment of the benefits of the
patent, notwithstanding its invalidity. The United States Su-
preme Court ruled on the licensee estoppel doctrine 10 years
later, and also held that a licensee who manufactured under the
license was estopped from questioning the validity of the patent.6
Thereafter, the doctrine was progressively weakened. While re-
affirming the doctrine in United States v. Harvey Steel Com-
pany7 and more recently in Automatic Radio Manufacturing
Company v. Hazeltine Research Incorporated8 the Court, in other
cases, has found it necessary to make numerous exceptions 9 and
to narrow its limits.' 0
The Court in Lear addressed itself to the issue of whether
the doctrine of licensee estoppel should be invoked to prevent
Lear from challenging Adkins' patent."" The Court emphasized
the numerous exceptions which had been made to the general
rule, concluded that the decision reached in Hazeltine in 1950
could no longer be considered the general rule, and therefore
expressly overruled that decision. 12 The Court conceded that
under contract principles, the mere receipt of some benefit is
sufficient to require the enforcement of the contract, regardless
of the validity of the underlying patent.' 3  The Court, how-
5. Wilder v. Adams, 29 F. Cas. 1216 (No. 17,647) (C.C.D. Mass.
1846).
6. Kinsman v. Parkhurst, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 298 (1856).
7. 196 U.S. 310 (1905).
8. 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
9. See Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945)(licensee may introduce prior art taught by an expired patent to deter-
mine parties' obligations under current patent); Westinghouse Co. v.
Formica Co., 266 U.S. 342 (1924) (licensee may introduce prior state of
the art to construe and narrow the claims of the patent).
10. See MacGregor v. Westinghouse Co., 329 U.S. 402 (1947) (va-
lidity of patent must be determined to ascertain effect of price-fixing
clause in license agreement); Katzinger v. Chicago Mfg. Co., 329 U.S.
394 (1947); Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (valid-
ity of patent must be determined to ascertain effect of price-fixing
clause in license agreement); Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224,
234 (1892) (under the Sherman Act, licensee not bound by license
agreement which waives his right to raise a defense in a suit brought
against him).
11. 395 U.S. at 661-62.
12. Id. at 671.
13. Id. at 669.
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ever, emphasized the fact that the Patent Office reaches its de-
cision as to whether an invention is patentable in an ex parte
proceeding, without the aid of argument by parties interested in
patent validity.14 When the licensor's equities based on con-
tract law15 were balanced against the public interest in the free
use of ideas which are a part of the public domain, the doctrine
of licensee estoppel was given a "decent public burial."' 6
To effectuate the decision, the Court ruled that if the patent
is found to be invalid, the licensee's release from the duty to
make royalty payments is retroactive to the date of issue of the
patent,17 not merely to the date of patent invalidation or the date
of royalty payment stoppage. Noting that often the licensee is
the only one in a position to benefit materially from invalidation,
the Court sought to give him a real incentive to challenge the
patent. The Court also attempted to avoid dilatory court tactics
that might be devised by the licensor if the licensee was obli-
gated until the date of invalidation.' 8
In balancing the parties' equities, the Lear Court neglected
to mention the public policy which encourages licensing as an
efficient means of utilizing discoveries. Conceivably Lear could
have a stifling effect upon inventors entering into licensing agree-
ments. But when consideration is given to the fact that the
Patent Office is extremely overworked and that the process of
determining novelty is at best difficult,19 the policy of protecting
only those inventions that actually are novel20 outweighs con-
tract principles and dictates repudiation of the licensee estoppel
doctrine. In the aftermath of the Lear decision, however, several
questions remain unanswered and thus create uncertainty as to
future licensing procedures.
First, the incentive given licensees to challenge patent valid-
ity could lead to abuse if proper restrictions are not established.
After Lear the licensee would appear to be strongly tempted to
14. Id. at 670.
15. The Court reasoned that strict compliance with contract law
would permit a licensor to procure a patent by fraud and then by agree-
ment prevent the licensee from challenging the patent. Id. at 670.
16. MacGregor v. Westinghouse Co., 329 U.S. 402, 416 (1947) (dis-
senting opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
17. 395 U.S. at 674.
18. Id. at 673. The question of the amount of royalties that had
accrued prior to patent issuance was remanded to the trial court for
determination along with the issue of the validity of the patent.
19. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
20. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8. For an excellent discussion of the
development of the patent laws and patent office examining procedure,
see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 1-17 (1966).
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terminate royalty payments while continuing to manufacture the
licensed product or to use the licensed process. Even if a suit to
recover unpaid royalties is initiated by the licensor, the licensee
would appear to be in an advantageous position. If the patent is
declared valid, the licensee must pay only that which he is al-
ready obligated under the contract to pay.21 If the patent is
adjudged invalid, the licensee may use the former patent free
from the threat of an infringement suit, and no royalties after
the date of the patent issuance must be paid. The licensee may
also be able to use dilatory court tactics, precisely what the
Court sought to bar the licensor from using.22 If the patent is
held valid, the delay has cost the licensee nothing in additional
royalties. If invalid, he has extended the period during which
he has enjoyed a market monopoly without cost since a com-
petitor would be unlikely to risk infringement and injunction
while the patent's validity is undetermined.
The licensee, however, when considering whether or not to
terminate his royalty payments, must also evaluate the possi-
bility of other consequences. After the licensee breaches the
contract by stopping royalty payments, the licensor has the op-
tion of suing for expectation damages in the form of unpaid
royalties or of considering the contract obligations to be at an
end and bringing an action for patent infringement. If the latter
is chosen and if the court finds that the repudiation of the
license agreement was undertaken maliciously or only to oppress
the licensor, the court may award treble damages to the licensor
if the patent is declared to be valid.23 It is likely that treble
damages would seriously alter the profit picture of the licensed
product or process. Liberal use of this safeguard would assure
that a licensee seriously consider the outcome of the trial before
initiating the suit. Furthermore, the licensee must realize that if
the patent is declared valid, the bitterness and antagonism gen-
erated between the parties during the course of litigation is
likely to make relicensing a distasteful or impossible task.
The Court's reasoning in determining the date of issue of the
patent, rather than the date of royalty payment termination or
date of patent invalidation, as the cut-off for licensee liability
creates further uncertainty. Although in Lear royalty payments
were stopped before patent issuance, the Court should have
realized that in many cases the date of payment termination will
21. But see text accompanying note 23 infra.
22. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1964).
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be long after the date of patent issuance. Clearly, the licensor
should not be liable for the return of Edl payments received subse-
quent to the date of patent issue due to the obvious inequity that
would arise. The licensor would likely find himself in a desper-
ate situation when suddenly required to produce a sum of money
which had been received over a number of years and which
had long since been spent.
By remanding the question of the parties' pre-patent issue
rights to the California Supreme CoUXt, 24 the Court avoided the
question of the disposition of related license agreements for trade
secrets and production "know-how." Often a single license agree-
ment specifies both a right to produce the patented invention,
and a right to use trade secret or "know-how" information
which is conveyed at the same time. If liability for payment for
this information is terminated when a patent is held invalid,
inequities would appear to result. A licensee could get a head
start on his competitors and after obtaining enough trade secret
information to secure his efficient production and entrench his
market position, he could terminate payment and retain the
knowledge without cost. If the Court intended a finding of
patent invalidity to affect only the obligations of the patent use,
licensors would undoubtedly price the secure "know-how"
agreement at a high rate as compared to the insecure obligations
under the patent-use agreement. How the courts would police
this practice leads to further uncertainty.
Similarly, the Court did not address itself to the question
of the inclusion of trade secret information in the patent agree-
ment. In a concurring opinion, however, Justice Black, joined
by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, expressed strong
disapproval of the practice of licensing the use of information
contained in patent applications. 2 It appears that Black would
pre-empt the states' allowance of any trade secret information
licensing on the ground that licenses of this nature restrict free
competition by promoting monopolies in that specific field. It
is obvious, however, that access to the information contained in
undisclosed patent applications is a major incentive to a licensee
to enter into such an agreement. If these agreements with their
attendant disclosure were eliminated, much of the licensing
would no longer be attractive. The :result is that the incentive
of licensees, relied on by the majorit, to challenge the validity
24. Prior to patent issuance, the license agreement conveyed only
the right to production "know-how."
25. 395 U.S. at 674, 677.
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of patents would be lacking and public policy would not be
served.
Lear strengthens the spirit of the patent laws by assur-
ing protection only to those inventors who deserve it. It does
this, however, by encouraging licensees to breach their license
agreements and to take a chance on the outcome of litigation.
The courts should make liberal use of infringement remedies by
issuing injunctions to cease manufacturing and by awarding
treble damages where there is deliberate overreaching by the
licensee. In addition, the courts should clarify whether, upon a
finding of patent invalidity, a licensor is liable for the return of
royalty payments made to him after the date of patent issuance,
and whether related agreements for trade secrets and production
"know-how" are to be terminated along with patent-use agree-
ments.
Securities Regulation: Tipster Not Liable
To Tippee Under Rule 10b-5
In January, 1965, the president of the Texstar Corporation,
William Rhame, informed his friend, Albert Kuehnert, that Tex-
star 'had negotiated a deal to drill two oil wells as "farmouts"
on land belonging to an oil company which Texstar was about to
acqfire. He also told Kuehnert that Texstar's dividends would
be* $3.00 per share for the fiscal year. Rhame suggested that
Kutehnert purchase enough stock to enable the two of them to
obtain control of Texstar. At that time Texstar was selling for
$4.25 per share on the American Stock Exchange. As a result of
this confidential information Kuehnert began purchasing Tex-
star stock and by May 1965, owned 94,600 shares. The dividend
prediction proved to be excessive and the "farmout" contract a
fabrication. Kuehnert was forced by successive margin calls to
sell his stock at a loss.' Kuehnert sued Rhame under Rule 10b-5 2
to recover what he had lost by relyiag on Rhame's fraudulent
representations. The federal district court gave summary judg-
ment for defendants Texstar and Rhame.3 In affirming, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, heZd that
Kuehnert, being a "tippee," was under the same obligations of
Rule 10b-5 to disclose material information as is a corporate in-
sider and was therefore barred by his own illegal conduct
from seeking recovery from his "tipster." Kuehnert v. Texstar
Corporation, 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969).
Since its promulgation, the scope of Rule 10b-5 has been
gradually expanded until at present it is one of the major in-
struments of securities regulation.4 Although not expressly au-
thorizing private enforcement of its provisions, Rule 10b-5
has been construed to permit private initiation in accordance
with its broad objective of protecting individual investors from
1. Also in May, Rhame resigned as president of Texstar "to de-
vote his time to personal business interests." The Wall Street Journal,
May 14, 1965, at 17, col. 2.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1969). While the complaint also alleged
that Rhame had violated 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) (1964), it did not allege
deceit. Kuehnert may have anticipated that in pari delicto would easily
be accepted as a defense to a common law action.
3. Kuehnert v. Texstar Corp., 286 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Tex. 1968).
The court held that "as a matter of law" a tippee cannot seek protection
in the securities act. Both the tipster and the tippee "must be painted
with the same brush and the same color." Id. at 345.
4. See generally A. BROWMERG, SEcurin'Es LAw: FRAuD-SEC
RULE lOb-5 (1967).
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fraudulent practices. 5 It is generally conceded. that the role of
these "private attorneys general" has contributed substantially
to the rule's development 6 and most courts have therefore decided
upon extensive private recovery.7
With the recent decisions of In re Cady, Roberts & Companys
and Texas Gulf Sulphur,9 the antifraud restrictions of the Rule
have been extended to encompass not only high corporate of-
ficials but also lesser employees and even nonemployees. In-
cluded within the last category is the tippee, the one to whom
the corporate insider has given the information.10 . Thus, the
tippee who fails either to adequately disseminate inside infor-
mation or to await its adequate dissemination before acting 'upon
it violates Rule 10b-5 and, like the tipster, is liable to a -vendor
or vendee of stock who is injured in the ensuing transac-
tions." While an innocent third party may recover from one
who violates Rule 10b-5, it was not clear whether a tippee
was entitled to recover his -losses from his tipster when both
were admitted violators of the Rule.
Courts have often invoked the doctrines of in pari delicto
and unclean hands to bar recovery by persons who have them-
selves participated in illegal conduct.' 2 In pari deicto denies
recovery on the basis that the plaintiff has knowingly partici-
pated as an equal in the illegal act which caused thb loss:'3
Unclean hands denies recovery because of the more general
equitable notion that a court of conscience should not grant re-
lief to one who has himself engaged in either illegal or unfair
practices. 14 The relevance of these defenses in modern judicial
procedure is in dispute and at least one prominent authority-has
concluded that "insofar as [unclean hands] is. a principle it is
not very helpful but is at times capable of causing considerable
harm."'
5
5. Fischman v. Raytheon Mg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951)';
Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961).
6. 412 F.2d at 706 n.2. See also Swenson, Remedies for Private
Parties Under Rule l1b-5, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 337 (1969).
7. E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.
1968).
8. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
9. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 198).
10. Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
11. 412 F.2d at 702 and cases cited therein.
12. See generally Chafee, Coming into Equity with Clean Rands,
47 M c. L. REV. 877, 1065 (1949).
13. Comment, 53 Mi=. L. REv. 827, 828 n.16 (1969) and cases
cited therein.
14. Id.
15. Chafee, supra note 12, at 878.
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There does seem to be general agreement that the defenses
of in pari delicto and unclean hands should be viewed less
favorably when the plaintiff is asserting a right to recovery
based on remedial legislation.' In fact, the United States Su-
preme Court recently held that in pari delicto is not available
as a defense in a treble-damage antitrust action,17 reasoning
that its allowance would inhibit private suits, which the Court
believed to be essential to the constructive development of the
antitrust prohibitions.'
These defenses have not often been a factor in securities reg-
ulation cases. While the unclean hands doctrine has been recog-
nized in the proxy solicitation area, the extent of its acceptance
is somewhat unclear.' 9  Prior to the Kuehnert decision, courts
confronted with these defenses in securities fraud litigation,
other than in proxy solicitation violations, adopted a comparative
analysis approach. 20 Instead of ascertaining only whether the
plaintiff had contaminated his own cause, the courts made the
defense dependent upon a comparison of the degree of culpability
16. 412 F.2d at 704. See also Shinsaku Nagano v. McGrath, 187
F.2d 753, 759 (7th Cir. 1951). Besides serving the public interest by
enforcing statutory prohibitions, an additional reason for not allowing
these defenses is that the legislature has expressed its belief that
plaintiffs are incapable of protecting them3elves and thus their involve-
ment in the misconduct should not be decisive. Remar v. Clayton
Sec. Corp., 81 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (D.C. Mass. 1949).
17. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S.
134 (1968). The Supreme Court, nevertheless, indicated that the defense
would be allowed if the plaintiff was "actively supporting the entire
restrictive program as such, participating in its formulation and en-
couraging its continuation." Id. at 140. 'For a discussion of this case,
see Comment, supra note 13.
18. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S.
134, 138 (1968).
19. In Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873, 879 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied,
361 tJ.S. 902 (1959), the leading case, the court had already found the de-
fendants not guilty before it spoke of the :plaintiff's own unclean hands.
In Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Products Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173 (W.D.
Mich. 1966), the unclean hands defense was allowed, but arguably it
was more directed to the plaintiff's forum shopping than to any definite
violations of the securities acts. And in Union Pac. R.R. v. Chicago &
Nw. Ry., 226 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. IlM. 1964), the court actually rejected
the defense, finding that the purpose of the proxy solicitation require-
ments in the securities acts would be defeated if it were allowed.
20. Thus in Can-Am Petroleum Co. v. Beck, 331 F.2d 371 (10th
Cir. 1964), the court, in analyzing the plainiff's role, noted that:
Her relationship as a pure investor became adulterated when
she actively assisted in selling others but she at no time had the
degree of culpability attributed to defendants and should not be
considered as in pari delicto.
Id. at 373, 374. See also Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1054
(2d Cir. 1969).
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of the plaintiff with that of the defendant. The courts invariably
stressed the successful fraud of the tipster rather than dwelling
on the tippee's participation.21 Thus, despite the plaintiff's ac-
tive assistance in the fraudulent scheme, his degree of culpabil-
ity was never found sufficient to deny recovery.22
In the Kuelmert factual context, the Fifth Circuit therefore
had to resolve the problem of whether to allow a tippee to re-
cover from his tipster when both were in violation of Rule 10b-
5.23 The court took notice that the unclean hands defense had
been allowed to deny relief for a proxy solicitation violation.2 4
The court then distinguished the antitrust violation situation on
the ground that the degree of public interest served by private
enforcement is greater in the antitrust area. If the tippee is per-
mitted to recover from his tipster, the court reasoned that he will
then be insured against loss in his transactions. If the in-
formation is true he will profit from his financial maneuvers
and if it is untrue he can recover from his informant. Believing
that the corporate insider is already subjected to adequate re-
straints by the Texas Gulf Sulphur decision, the majority de-
cided it best to give "appropriate discouragement" to the tippee.
If the tippee is faced with the prospect of irretrievable loss, he
will be less likely to act on unpublicized information. The
court therefore concluded that neither the equities of the situ-
ation nor the policy considerations of the securities laws justified
the further extension of recovery "when the only question is one
of accounting between joint conspirators. 2 15
The court apparently26 excluded all tippees from the protec-
21. See Stockwell v. Reynolds & Co., 252 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y.
1965), in which the court was confronted with a clear case of a tippee
being injured by acting on inside information which he received from
his brokerage firm. Nevertheless, the court consistently spoke of the
plaintiff only as a misled investor and continually dwelt on the fraud
alleged against the defendants. The court did not even consider the
plaintiff's obligations as a tippee.
22. These cases may be distinguishable from the Kuehnert situation
in that the plaintiffs apparently had not been motivated by an equally
fraudulent intent towards the third party vendees.
23. See Sarlie v. E L. Bruce Co., 265 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1967),
in which both the plaintiff and the defendant alleged violations of
Rule 10b-5, but the plaintiff defaulted before the court could reach the
merits.
24. See note 19 supra.
25. 412 F.2d at 703.
26. "Apparently" since the majority does refer to Kuehnert and
Rhame as "joint conspirators," possibly implying that a plaintiff who is
not a joint conspirator may be entitled to recovery. If this is so, the
majority reasoning would more closely approximate that of the Su-
preme Court in Perma Life.
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tion of Rule 10b-5, making no distinction between different
types of tippees.27 Thus, once a plaintiff is categorized as a
tippee, he is a fortiori considered in pari delicto and denied re-
covery. Although the court did not analyze the definitional
significance of the term "tippee," it appears to have adopted the
broad, unqualified definition of "persons given information by
insiders in breach of trust,"28 thereby placing a significant limi-
tation on the extent of potential recovery under Rule 10b-5.
Judge Godbold, in dissent, questioned the wisdom of allowing
the in pari delicto defense at all in securities fraud cases. 29 He
maintained that the public interest in the private enforcement of
the securities laws is as great as that served by private antitrust
suits. He argued that the dissemination of inside information
could be more effectively stopped at its source, the tipster, than
at its destination, the tippee. Also, since the tipster is likely to
be an important corporate official with access to legal counsel,
he can be expected to be better informed of the extent of Rule
10b-5 restrictions.
In analyzing the court's decision, the first aspect to consider
is whether the majority properly applied the in pari delicto
defense to the present situation. In pari delicto is usually trans-
lated as "in equal fault,130 and, in accordance with its purpose,
the stress should be on "equal" rather than on "fault." It appears
at least questionable whether the defrauded plaintiff's guilt or
fault would ever "equal" that of the fraudulent defendant. As
the court aptly stated, Kuehnert was "in fact a dupe," and "in
actuality, Kuehnert knowing nothing, concealed nothing, and
hence did not defraud his vendors."'1 The tippee is merely the
instrumentality or device through which the tipster-initiator ac-
complishes his fraudulent purpose.32  It is usually the tipster
27. See text accompanying note 35 infra.
28. Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
29. Judge Godbold in fact explicitly rejects the allowance of the
defense in a co-conspirator context, thus going even further than the
Perma Life exception. 412 F.2d at 706 n.3. See note 17 supra.
30. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 898 (4th ed. 1951). See also Serzysko
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
31. 412 F.2d at 703-04. Judge Aldrich, however, footnoted this
assumption with a caveat that, "[s]trictly speaking, this may have not
been so . . . ." Id. at 703 n.5. Of course, once a tippee has entered the
market, he has theoretically contaminated any subsequent transaction.
But in this context the third party vendors or vendees may be assumed
to have actually benefited from the tiplee's misinformation since the
market obviously went in the opposite direction from that anticipated
by the tippee.
32. Although the court never examines Rhame's actual motives for
misleading Kuehnert, they should also be a component of the deter-
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who creates the tippee3 3 and who conceives of and induces the
fraudulent activities. From either an equitable or a compar-
ative point of view, it would seem that the tippee's degree of
culpability would not be as great as that of the fraudulent tip-
ster. Thus, the court's acceptance of in pari delicto as a defense
may not be justified on the facts of the case. A more technically
correct application would seem to necessitate the comparative
approach adopted in the earlier securities regulation cases.
3 4
Moreover, the court would deny recovery to any party to whom
Kuehnert gave the fabricated information, even though as the
information passed farther outward from the fraudulent initiator,
the degree of complicity and guilt would seem to diminish.3 5
All would be categorized as tippees and thus would be in pari
delicto with the tipster. Since there are potentially infinite com-
binations of tippees and tipsters, the court's inflexible and arbi-
trary classification appears unwise. 36
The second aspect to consider is whether the majority's
decision best fulfills the objectives of Rule 10b-5. The only
time a tippee will sue a tipster is when the information is either
purposely or accidentally false and the tippee sustains a loss by
acting on it. Thus, the real problem is how most effectively to
advance the purposes of the securities laws in this limited situ-
ation. One of the main purposes of Rule 10b-5 is to prevent the
opportunistic dissemination or utilization of inside corporate in-
formation. Although the court concluded that the denial of re-
covery will exert a deterrent influence on tippees, it appears
rather wistful to believe that a person given information on a
mination of whether to allow the in pari delicto defense. Particularly if
Rhame was personally selling the stock which Kuehnert purchased, it
would seem inequitable to permit him to retain this gain. Even if
Rhame's ultimate intention was only to secure Kuehnert's financial
assistance in gaining control of Texstar, his utilization of his corporate
position to derive inequitable advantage from the unlawful dissemina-
tion of fraudulent information is reprehensible.
33. There may be instances where one could deceptively elicit in-
side information from an insider. In such a case, the tippee may
actually have created the tipster.
34. See text accompanying note 20 supra.
35. Bromberg, recognizing this problem, has suggested several cri-
teria which could be utilized to classify the degree of culpability and
complicity of different tippees. These are: (1) specificity of informa-
tion; (2) knowledge of company source; (3) degree of diffusion of
information; (4) knowledge of nonpublic character; (5) probability of
accuracy of information; (6) extent of use by tippee, and (7) tippee's
remoteness. A. BROAMERG, supra note 4, §§ 7.5(6) (a)-(g) (1967).
36. This problem, of course, could be avoided by the adoption of
restrictive guidelines for inclusion in the tippee category for this pur-
pose.
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corporation's prospects by a high corporate official will be in-
hibited from acting upon it by what legal remedies he may or
may not have if the tipster is misleading him. It seems more
plausible to assume that a corporate official will be deterred
from deceiving potential tippees by the realization that they
will be able to invoke statutory assistance to recover their losses
from his fraudulent information. Attacking the prepublication
dissemination of inside information after it has been communi-
cated and then only by punishing the one to whom it is com-
municated seems less efficient than applying every possible dis-
couragement to the one who controls this dissemination and
who is actually the one who gains from its misuse.37
The court also appears unduly optimistic in its belief that
publication of the inside information will expose the tipster's
intended fraud on the tippee. The practical obstacles facing the
tippee in adequately publicizing the information would seem
to warrant placing this burden on one better situated to fulfill
its requirements.38 And even if the tippee is able to gain some
attention for his predictions, it is nevertheless difficult to agree
with the court that disclosure would allow "the free market to
probe and evaluate his information."3 P' It seems more likely that
the free market would ignore his information.
What the Kuehnert decision has done is to tell the corporate
insider that if he gives out false information to induce action on
the part of his tippee, he need not fear private enforcement of
Rule 10b-5. The tipster will only be liable when his information
is true and a third party vendor or vendee is actually injured.
If the tipster restrains himself to defrauding only his tippee, he
is free from any potential tippee recovery. On the other hand,
if his tippee, given accurate information, defrauds a third party,
then the tipster is also liable to the third party. Thus Kuehnert
presents the paradoxical situation that the tipster is not liable
for his own successful fraudulent actions, but is liable for the
successful fraudulent actions of another. This problem can be
resolved by looking at each fraudulent relationship separately.
37. See Note, 22 VAND. L. Ray. 359, 366 n.36 (1969), which states
that the "public interest might be better served by cutting off illicit tips
at their source, and one method of realizing this objective would be the
disalowance of the in pari delicto defense in a suit by a tippee."
38. But see In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961),
where the S.E.C. decided that, "If, on the other hand, disclosure prior
to effecting a purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic under
the circumstances, we believe the alternative is to forego the transac-
tion."
39. 412 F.2d at 704.
[Vol. 54:878
CASE COMMENTS
If the tipster intends to defraud his tippee, he should be made
to account for his own fraud. If the tippee intends to defraud
the third party vendor or vendee, he should be made to ac-
count to the third party. In this way each is held responsible for
his own misdeeds and is accountable to those he has injured.
There is then a symmetrical recoupment of loss and no one
escapes unpenalized. There is deterrence of both the tipster and
the tippee, for whatever harm each has caused. This solution
would fulfill the statutory intention of the securities laws in pro-
tecting the investor in each relationship from fraudulent conduct.
The court would merely be putting each party in statu quo ante,
so that neither would be receiving any profit from his own
violation of Rule 10b-5.
Whether one approaches the decision in terms of the tech-
nical application of the in pari delicto defense or in terms of the
policy considerations underlying the securities laws, the tip-
pee should be allowed to seek judicial relief. 40 The majority's
rigid denial of any tippee recovery will likely have little inhibi-
tive effect on the tippee, while providing unwarranted protection
for the tipster. Although it is perhaps unpleasant to allow one
wrongdoer to recover his losses from another, in the securities
regulation instance this would better accomplish the objective
of investor protection. The tipster would thereby be forced to
account for his fraud and the tippee, though compensated for his
own loss, would be liable for any damage his own actions had
caused.
40. Of course, there may be unusual instances where both parties
have so involved themselves in the fraudulent undertaking that neither
should be allowed to seek recovery from the other. An example of this
might be where the tipster secures no advantage from giving the tip
and the tippee becomes such an active participant in the scheme as to
qualify as the motivating force. Then it may be that neither party
would actually be a tippee in the submissive sense of one who receives
inside information but both would be active co-conspirators to an un-
successful fraud. This exception would be consistent with the Perma
Life decision. See notes 17 & 26 supra.
1970]
Securities Regulation: Corporation Held Liable
Under 16b for Deputy's Short-Swing Sale
After His Resignation as Director
Defendant Martin Marietta Corporation (Martin) pur-
chased 801,300 shares of Sperry Rand Corporation's (Sperry)
common stock between December 14, 1962, and July 24, 1963, and
subsequently sold them between August 29 and September 6,
1963. Plaintiff, a stockholder of Sperry, brought suit against Mar-
tin on behalf of Sperry alleging that defendant had violated
section 16b of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 The allega-
tion was based on the fact that George M. Bunker, the president
and chief executive officer of Martin, had also been a director
of Sperry from April 29 until August 31, 1963. Plaintiff sought
recovery of the profits realized by Martin on the sale of the
101,300 shares of Sperry stock which had been purchased while
Bunker served on Sperry's board. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, reversing the district court,2 held that Martin had
"deputized" Bunker to act on its behalf and the corporation was
therefore liable, as if it were a director, under section 16b of
the Act for profits realized on securities bought while the deputy
was a director and sold within six months, even though the
deputy's resignation had become effective before the sale. Feder
1. For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information
which may have been obtained by such beneficial owner, di-
rector, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer,
any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any
sale and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other
than an exempted security) within any period of less than six
months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in
connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and
be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the
part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering
into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of
not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six
months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law
or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the
issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name
and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to
bring such suit within sixty days after request or shall fail
diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit
shall be brought more than two years after the date such profit
was realized. This subsection shall not be construed to cover
any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both
at the time of the purchase and sale, cr the sale and purchase,
of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which
the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not
comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964).
2. Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 286 F. Supp. 937 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
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v. Martin Marietta Corporation, 406 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3267 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1970).3
The reasons underlying the enactment of 16b are related to
the activities of investors prior to 1929 when trading by insiders
was an accepted practice of businessmen.4 A stockholder who
felt he had been wronged by such dealings had his sole recourse 5
in the common law doctrine of special circumstances, 6 which re-
quired him to prove that all relevant circumstances indicated
that the insider had taken an inequitable advantage. This placed
an almost insurmountable burden of proof upon the plaintiff
stockholder.7 But the stock crash of 1929 demonstrated, among
other things, that the stock markets were sorely in need of more
rigorous regulation than that provided by common law. The
result was the enactment of the Securities Act of 19338 and the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.9
Section 16b of the Exchange Act was designed to prevent
corporate insiders from profiting by the use of inside informa-
tion in transactions involving the corporation's stock. Due to
the difficulty of proving a causal relationship between the trans-
action and the inside information, 16b allowed recovery on any
transaction occurring within a six month period.10 The assump-
tion underlying 16b is that to allow the insider to profit from his
inherent advantage vis-a-vis ordinary investors, would harm
the stock market in general. Although some writers have ques-
tioned the validity of this assumption, 1 section 16b's vitality as
3. Commented on in 1969 DuxE L.J. 812; 22 VAND. L. REV. 1003
(1969).
4. 10 S.E.C. ANN. REP. 50 (1944): "[P]rofits from 'sure thing'
speculation in the stocks of their corporations were more or less
generally accepted by the financial community as part of the emolument
for serving as a corporate officer or director notwithstanding the fla-
grantly inequitable character of such trading."
5. See McDowell, Director's Liability in Securities Transactions,
22 Bus. LAw 76, 77 (1966): "The 1933 Act . . . was really the first
statute to impose liability on directors for material false statements or
ommissions in securities selling literature."
6. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1943).
7. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909), for an example of
the problems faced by a stockholder who felt himself wronged by a
corporate insider.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1964).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78u (1964).
10. Section 10b and rule 10b-5 are designed to prevent the
fraudulent use of inside information by anyone, whether or not the
transactions occur within a six month period. See SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
11. See H. MANNE, Ixsinxa TRADiNG AND THE STOCK MLAlMET
(1966).
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a security regulation has not been diminished, and in fact has
increased since its inception.
Section 16b, upon first reading, appears to be a fairly direct
and uncomplicated piece of legislative draftsmanship. This is
understandable because its framers intended that it be objective
and simple, thereby making compliance with it relatively easy.
Ironically, the attributes which the section's framers felt to be
one of its virtues have probably caused it to be the focus of much
litigation and private settlement.12 The key to interpreting the
myriad cases that have arisen under 16b lies in the opening
clause of the section, which has been read by the courts to be a
clear statement of legislative intent.1 3 The courts have followed
the framers' intent in treating section 16b as nothing more
than a "crude rule of thumb' ' 4 and have reached decisions by
looking to this intent rather than a literal interpretation of the
statute. 5
12. Hamilton, Convertible Securities and Section 16(b): The End
of an Era, 44 TEXAS L. Rnv. 1447, 1449 (1966). Examples are numerous.
The statute does not define the point at which an owner becomes a
"beneficial owner." Blau v. Ogsbury, 210 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1954).
Nor does it say whether a partnership can be considered a "director."
Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. .959). The term "officer" is
extremely ambiguous and had to be further: defined. 17 C.F.R. § 240.36-
2 (1969). The terms "purchase" and "sale" do not clearly delineate
what transactions were comprehended. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d
342 (6th Cir. 1958); SEC Securities Act Release No. 34-7826, Feb. 17,
1966; Hamilton, supra. The phrase, "within any period of less than six
months" does not say precisely when the period begins or ends. Adler
v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959). The section does not differ-
entiate a "class" from a "series" of equity securities. Ellerin v. Massa-
chusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259 (2d Cir. 1959). Finally, the
Commissioner's power to grant exemptions does not give that body as
much latitude as was once thought. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136
F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943).
13. Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1959).
14. This view of the section was derived from a statement made
by Thomas G. Corcoran, the principal draftsman of the 1934 Act during
hearings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency:
You hold the director, irrespective of amy intention or expecta-
tion to sell the security within 6 months after, because it will
be absolutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention
or expectation, and you have to have this crude rule of thumb,
because you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove
that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out on
a short swing.
Hearings before Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, S. Res.
No. 84, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., (1933); S. Res. No. 56 and S. Res. No. 97,
73d Cong. 1st & 2d Sess. 6557 (1934).
15. It has been said, "[the question of the definition of terms] ...
is not in any event primarily a semantic one, but must be resolved in
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Feder presented two primary issues, one of first impression
and one which added new insights on a more familiar problem.
The latter was whether Bunker, as president and chief executive
officer of Martin, had been deputized to act on behalf of Martin
on the Sperry board of directors. According to what the court
called a "legal fiction,"'16 developed through a series of cases,
if he were deputized, the Martin Marietta Corporation would be
considered a director under section 16b and thereby would be
subject to its requirements and sanctions.
Rattner v. Lehman'17 has often been referred to as the case
in which the seeds of the deputization theory were planted.
The case involved stock transactions by a partnership, with one
of the partners serving on the corporation's board of directors.
The Second Circuit held that the partner-director must give up
his share of the profits, but that since he had not caused the
partnership to engage in the transactions the other partners
would not have to release theirs. The court added a significant
caveat, however; "[w]hether the result might be different had
he caused the firm to make [the purchase] we need not now
determine."' 8 Judge Learned Hand raised this question in his
concurrence with a statement that has often been referred to as
the origin of the deputization theory. 9 The theory moved to
the brink of judicial acceptance in 1962 when the Supreme Court,
in Blau v. Lehman,20 indicated, without so holding, that a part-
nership could be considered a director under 16b.21 Subse-
quently, the theory was given full acceptance in Marquette
Cement Manufacturing Company v. Andreas,22 where the federal
the light of the legislative purpose-to curb short swing speculation by
insiders." Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 344 (6th Cir. 1958).
16. 406 F.2d at 262.
17. 193 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1952).
18. Id. at 565.
19. [T] he only question is whether partners are liable for what-
ever profits the firm may make, whenever one of their members
is a director, and only because he is a director. I agree that§ 16(b) does not go so far; but I wish to say nothing as to
whether, if a firm deputed a partner to represent its interests
as a director on the board, the other partners would not be
liable. True, they would not even then be formally "director";
but I am not prepared to say that they could not be so con-
sidered; for some purposes the common law does treat a firm
as a jural person.
Id. at 566-567 (concurring opinion).
20. 368 U.S. 403 (1962).
21. Id. at 409.
22. 239 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In Marquette, defendant
was the sole trustee for 19 trusts. Together these trusts owned all
shares of a certain corporation. Defendant sold all of that corporation's
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district court said: "That such a deputization is possible seems
clear after Blau v. Lehman, . . . but its existence is a question
of fact to be settled case by case." 23 However, the court then
held that the mere fact that a stockholder in a corporation has
engaged in a short swing transaction from which the corporation
has also benefited was an insufficient basis upon which to find
deputization. 24 Thus the court in Feder could say, "the validity
of the deputization theory, presumed to be valid here by the
parties and by the district court, is unquestionable. ' 2r Even so,
the finding of such deputization is based on the facts of each
case. It was on this consideration that the court of appeals re-
versed the district court decision in Feder.
The district court made several findings of fact in support
of its conclusion that Bunker had not been deputized by Martin:
(1) Sperry initially invited Bunker to join its board two and a
half months before Martin began its accumulation of Sperry
stock; (2) Bunker turned down a second offer by Sperry at a
time when Martin already held 400,000 shares of Sperry stock;
(3) Sperry, not Martin, took the initiative to encourage Bunker
to accept the directorship; (4) No other Martin employee was
ever mentioned for the position in the event Bunker absolutely
declined, and (5) Bunker's fine reputation and engineering
expertise was the prime motivation for Sperry's interest in
him.26 The court of appeals, however, found additional, more
germane and uncontradicted evidence which was either over-
looked or ignored by the district court: (1) Bunker's own testi-
mony concerned his extensive responsibilities and authority
within his corporation;2 7 (2) Bunker's testimony revealed that
several Sperry officials had discussed their company's "short
range outlook" with Bunker while he was a Sperry director;
(3) An unsigned document, allegedly originating in Martin's
assets to the plaintiff in return for some of the latter's stock and then
sold this stock one month later. Defendant, subsequently, was held
liable only for the profits earned by the two trusts of which he was the
beneficiary. The plaintiff claimed that all of the trusts should be held
liable based on the deputization theory.
23. Id. at 967.
24. Id.
25. 406 F.2d at 263.
26. Id. at 264.
27. Bunker's position was such that he could have received in-
formation and, without disclosing it to other Martin men, could have
used it to the corporation's advantage. Thus, the court held that a find-
ing of a lack of disclosure on Bunker's part was irrelevant. All that
was necessary was the possibility of informaLional misuse. Id.
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files, contained descriptions and evaluations of Sperry's manage-
ment and future outlook; 28 (4) Bunker's letter of resignation
to General MacArthur, then chairman of the Sperry board of di-
rectors, which gave strong indications that at least MacArthur
and Bunker were under the impression that the latter was repre-
senting Martin on Sperry's board;29 (5) The fact that Martin's
Board of Directors formally consented to and approved Bunker's
acceptance of the Sperry directorship before Bunker had ac-
cepted the position, and (6) Martin made a practice of placing
representatives on the board of directors of other firms and
Bunker's directorship differed from the others in only minor
ways.
In balancing these facts, Feder was as imprecise as its prede-
cessors in its appraisal of what factors must be present to reach
a finding that a director has been deputized by his corporation.
Although the Feder court pointed out several broadly defined
factors which it felt were significant, it failed to point out the
relative importance it placed on each of them or how they would
affect a decision in a slightly different factual setting.30 One
fact is certain, however. No lawyer can accurately advise his
client on the basis of this court record.
The second major issue of Feder was whether a director
(in this case, Martin Marietta Corporation) could be held liable
for the profits realized on securities bought while a director and
sold within six months, but not until after the director's resigna-
tion had become effective. Although the issue is one of first
impression, an earlier decision held that section 16b imposes
liability upon a person who is not a director at the date of pur-
28. Its title may be explanatory of the document's contents. It
was entitled "Notes on Exploratory Investment in Sperry Rand Corpora-
tion." The court said that these three findings alone raised a strong
presumption that Bunker had been deputized, although they declined to
so hold without further evidence. Id.
29. The letter of resignation stated:
When I became a member of the Board in April, it appeared
to your associates that the Martin Marietta ownership of a sub-
stantial number of shares of Sperry Rand should have represen-
tation on your Board. This representation does not seem to me
really necessary and I prefer not to be involved in the affairs
of Sperry Rand when there are so many other demands on my
time.
Id. at 265.
30. The court stated, for example, that to be deputized, a director
who does not disclose information to his company must have a great
deal of authority and responsibility within the corporation he repre-
sents. "Authority" and "responsibility" are terms whose ambiguity
can only further obscure the definition of a deputy.
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chase, but becomes one before selling his stock. In Adler v.
Klawans,31 the court reached this decision by reading the Con-
gressional intent of section 16b as prohibiting the purchase and
sale of a security, "by someone within one of the proscribed
categories, i.e., one who was a director, officer, or beneficial
owner at some time. '32 By reading the words "at some time"
into the statute, the court clearly went beyond the statutory
language itself and rested its decision primarily upon legislative
intent. The court also pointed out that while a "beneficial
owner" must be such at both the time of the purchase and the
sale in dispute, similar provision is not made in regard to directors
and officers. The court inferred that Congress did not intend
that officers and directors be such at both ends of the transac-
tion.
Although Adler did not mention it, some additional statutory
basis can be found for its decision. Section 16a provides: "Every
person . . .who is a director . . .shall file, at the time of the
registration of such security or within ten days after he be-
comes such ... director ... a statement with the exchange
.... Thus it could be argued that an individual who buys
securities and sells them after becoming a director was meant
to come under section 16b sanctions on the theory that if a
person must file under section 16a then he is automatically sub-
ject to section 16b.
This statutory support for the rationale of Adler has signifi-
cance in the Feder decision. No similar specific provisions of
section 16a can be interpreted to imply that Congress intended
that officers and directors must file after they have left their
position. This fact would have meant that Martin had no duty
to file and therefore incurred no liability if Rule 16a-1034 of the
Securities and Exchange Commission had been upheld. In es-
sence, this rule says that if an individual is exempted from the re-
quirements of 16a, he is exempted from 16b. The Commissioner's
power to grant exemptions pursuant to the last sentence of
section 16b, however, is not beyond the purview of judicial inter-
vention,3 5 since the Commission's powers to grant exemptions
31. 267 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1959).
32. Id. at 844.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (a) (1964) (emphasis added).
34. "Any transaction which has been or shall be exempted by the
Commission from the requirements of section 16 (a) shall, in so far as it
is otherwise subject to the provisions of section 16(b), be likewise
exempted from section 16(b)." 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-10 (1969).
35. See Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d 689, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1957).
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is limited to transactions "not comprehended within the purposes
of this subsection. 301 In order to determine whether Martin
could be held liable, the Feder court had to decide whether
the Commission acted within its power when it made rule 16a-10.
The court began its reasoning by asking whether the trans-
action was of the type which Congress had intended to eliminate.
The court reasoned that where the security is purchased before
the buyer becomes a director, only a subsequent sale could be
motivated by inside information. On the other hand, where the
purchase is made during the directorship and the sale is made
after the resignation, both the purchase and the sale could be
motivated by inside information. From this analysis, the court
concluded that the latter transaction was definitely of the type
which Congress meant to control and that Rule 16a-10 was invalid
to the extent that it exempted such a transaction. At this point,
the court's analysis had followed a line of reasoning characteristic
of section 16b decisions, i.e. "every transaction which can reason-
ably be defined as a purchase will be so defined, if the transaction
is of a kind which can possibly lend itself to the speculation en-
compassed by section 16 (b).,,7 Certainly, a sale of stock within
six months after leaving a position as director could easily be
motivated by inside information.
If the court had concluded its opinion when it reached
this point, there would be little reason to question its decision.
The court, however, chose to go on, explaining that Form 4-
provided by the SEC for a director to file his monthly statement
of changes in stock ownership-requires beneficial owners, di-
rectors and officers to file if they are in one of those categories
at any time during a calendar month. Thus if an individual is
a director on September 1 and resigns on September 2, he must
file a Form 4 statement for the month of September. This, in
effect, would require a director to file one month after his
resignation. The court felt this was an arbitrarily inadequate
requirement because it places a great deal of emphasis on the
director's date of resignation. For instance, if the hypothetical
director had resigned on August 31, he would not have had to file
under Form 4 for September. For this reason, the court decided
that 16b applies for six months from the date of purchase, re-
gardless of the date of resignation.
It is difficult to understand the court's reasoning since the
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (b) (1964).
37. Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345 (6th Cir. 1958).
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six month requirement is as arbitra:ry as the Form 4 require-
ment. Just as the director may choose to avoid liability by re-
signing on the last day of the month, he can wait six months plus
one day and sell with impunity.38 Since the section was in-
tended to be objective, arbitrary and therefore relatively simple
to obey,39 Form 4's arbitrariness should not be considered an
improper exercise of the Commission's power. What the court
did in Feder was to take note of the camel's nose under the tent
and reason that because of its presence the whole beast must be
admitted. Such reasoning, after what; appeared to be customary
grounds for an extension of section 16b, gives the impression that
the court lacked confidence in that original position.
The impact of Feder upon future security transactions by
corporate insiders remains in doubt. It seems likely that section
16b could be extended to a director's purchase and sale, both
occurring after his resignation.40  Although the reasoning of
Feder does nothing to dispel this possibility, the courts may
wisely reject it and require claimants to seek redress under Rule
10b-5 of the Exchange Act or similar remedies. Such an ex-
tension would unduly inhibit an individual from any short swing
trading in the stock of a corporation if he had ever served on
its board. This results from the fact that the claimant under
section 16b need not prove that the insider actually used inside
information when engaged in short swing trading. Since all
he needs to prove is that the insider was in fact an insider, no
former director would be able to engage in short swing trading
of a corporation's stock after leaving its board of directors. Thus,
Rule 10b-5 and other remedies which require proof of the actual
use of inside information are more equitable means of controlling
the short swing trading of former directors.
Another problem presented by Feder is the fact that 16b
liability was imposed upon an insider who apparently relied
upon an SEC ruling which was later found to be invalid. Ac-
cording to SEC Form 4, which governs the reporting provision of
section 16a, Martin was required to fie only for the month in
which its deputy, Bunker, resigned from Sperry's board. SEC
Rule 16a-10 provided that any transaction exempted from section
16a reporting requirements, "shall in. so far as it is otherwise
38. Babbitt v. Lachner, 332 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1964).
39. Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507, 515 (2d Cir. 1966); Petteys v.
Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 1966); Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.,
136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1943).
40. For more discussion on this poin't see 1969 DUKE L.J. 812, 817.
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subject to the provisions of section 16(b), be likewise exempted
from section 16(b). '41 This would result in the conclusion
that Martin was exempt from section 16b liability for transac-
tions occurring after the month in which Bunker resigned. Fe-
der, however, found this aspect of Rule 16a-10 invalid,4 2 and yet
did not consider the impact of section 23a of the Exchange Act.
This section states that liability under the Act should not be im-
posed where a party has relied in good faith on a SEC rule which
is later determined to be invalid.43 The court imposed section
16b liability without discussing section 23a even though Martin
had apparently relied in good faith on SEC Rule 16a-10.4 4 The
court's failure to mention this section is especially troublesome
in light of the difficulty an insider has in determining his status
regarding 16b. This difficulty stems from the judicial extension
of 16b liability based upon an interpretation of Congressional in-
tent with little attention to the precise language of the statute it-
self.
The decision in Feder raises more problems than it solves.
There is a need for the development of definitive guidelines on
how to determine when a director has been deputized to act on
behalf of another corporation. The present case by case approach
can only force directors and their attorneys into unnecessary
confusion, uncertainty and overcaution in their securities deal-
ings. Since one of the goals of section 16b was to provide an
objective test for the imposition of liability, it seems imperative
that corporations should be provided with means for determining
the question of deputizing with certainty. Such means could
41. 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-10 (1969).
42. 406 F.2d at 268. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
43. Section 23a:
No provision of this chapter imposing any liability shall
apply to any act done or ommitted in good faith in conformity
with any rule or regulation of the Commission or the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, notwithstanding that
such rule or regulation may, after such act or ommission, be
amended or rescinded or be determined by judicial or other
authority to be invalid for any reason.
15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1964).
44. Martin's reliance is shown by the fact that it did not begin to
sell its Sperry stock until one month had elapsed following Bunker's
resignation. Imposition of section 16b liability in circumstances such
as this places an attorney in a most difficult position when advising his
client.
The solution to such unexpected liability can be found in a more
extensive use of the section 23a "good faith reliance doctrine" which has
already been used in some 16b cases. See, e.g., Greene v. Dietz, 247 F.2d
689 (2d Cir. 1957).
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be provided by a more specific opinion than Feder, by an amend-
ment to the 1934 Act, or by SEC regulation.
Preferably, the SEC should promulgate a regulation which
would state that any officer, director or beneficial owner placed
on the board of another corporation would be prima facie pre-
sumed to be a deputy of his company. In addition, any other
agent whose primary purpose is to represent his corporation on
the board of another corporation would be conclusively pre-
sumed deputized. These criteria have the advantage of using
terms whose meanings the courts have already considered as
well as including most of the individuals a corporation would
be likely to use as representatives of its interests on the board
of another company. Further, if anyone outside one of these
groups were to serve as a director, the courts would be un-
likely to find that he had been deputized under the tests laid
down in Feder.45
These reforms of section 16b have been suggested in an
attempt to alleviate the almost unavoidable problems of a stat-
ute meant to be objective and simple, but which expresses Con-
gressional intent in such unequivocal terms that the courts have
felt obligated to extend its sanctions as far as possible. Section
16b was not meant to impose a general hindrance upon the in-
vestment practices of insiders. It was meant to render profitless
an investment practice within a specific time period by a limited
group of individuals which had frequently resulted in an un-
fair advantage to them. It was meant to be one part of a
comprehensive regulatory scheme, and not the sole regulatory
device for insider trading.
45. This amendment would not place as great a burden on the
deputizing corporation as it may first appmer. If the corporation wishes
to sell its stock it need wait only six months and do so then. Of
course, it is protected from a falling market by the fact that it may sell
when the price of the stock reaches the purchase price even though six
months have not passed. Section 16b states that no profits may be
realized by a short swing transaction; it does not prohibit short swing
sales per se.
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